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FOREWORD
G. Fryer
Superintendent in Charge
Prosecuting Branch,
N.S.W. Police Department.
If policemen were to make arrests every time they encountered a possible
arrest situation the administration ofjustice would soon grind toa halt. It has
been estimated that every arrest represents at least ﬁve “probable ca use" arrest
situations. In addition to this the police also exercise considerable
prosecutional discretion. This means that the police exercise a larger
discretion than judges or magistrates or any other official involved in the
criminaljustice system. It is not surprising therefore that the subject of“Police
Discretion" has been a topic for lively discussion for many years and in many
parts of the world.
I believe however that this seminar provided the forum for it to be fully
ventilated in New South Wales for the first time. I fully expected that such a
subject would have provoked a vigorous, possibly even acrimonious, debate
and brought to the surface many conﬂicting viewpoints.
This did not prove to be the case. The Chairman for this Seminar. the
Chief Justice, expressed the feeling of those attending when he made the
comment at the conclusion that everybody present was unanimous that police
do and should have a discretion in the criminal process.
Mr T. Davidson in his paper mentioned other types of systems in use
when he said:
There are various methods by Which the ambit and exercise of the
discretion might be brought within the purview of the legal system. In
Scotland except in minor cases,- prosecutions are initiated by lawyers
who act independently of the police Such a system also exists in the
U.SA. Although it has been recommended that a similar system should
be adopted in England and Wales neither the Scottish nor the US.
systems appear to contain any requirement that the police are bound to
refer all matters to the appropriate prosecuting authority so that thereIS
still room for the exercise ofa discretion which may resultIn the system
of legal control being by-passed. (page l9)
.Although other systems were referred to none of the speakers enlarged
on them nor supported the proposition that they should be introduced in
N.S.W.
A viewpoint was expressed during discussion time that if police
exercised their discretion not to prosecute they could be deprivinga person of
the benefit of receiving rehabilitation treatment. This could well be the
position and to overcome this type of situation it would be necessary to
introduce a statutory power to allow police to help people under these
circumstances.
I0
Dr Jocelyn Scutt of the Women’s Advisory Council during questiontime suggested that police exercise their discretion in domestic mattersdifferently than in criminal matters. She wanted police to take more actionthan they do at present. This prompted some discussion and caused InspectorJohn Murray of South Australia to refer to their system of dealing withdomestic matters. This involved a Crisis Care Unit which was established forthe domestic trouble scene. The unit attends the home and counsels the partiesinvolved. I noticed after the Seminar that Inspector Murray was kept busyanswering questions about this Unit.
It was interesting to note Mr John Parnell‘s (Magistrate) commentswhen he said N.S.W. was about to introduce a Community Justice System tocope with domestic situations. This system would be similar to a CanadianSystem that was in operation in that country. Mr M Callaghan (Magistrate)stated that the Family Law .40! had done nothing to reduce the family.violence. He suggested the community must face the domestic problem andnot leave it to the police.
Inspector C Naylor whilst speaking on his paper outlined some of thesafety checks that are applicable to police if they exercise their discretion toarrest under circumstances that could not bejustified. He referred to:-
I. The station sergeant has to accept or reject the charge; _
2. If a doubt arises the constable has to satisfy his officer that the
charge is warranted;
3. The person charged on appearing at court can complain to thepresiding magistrate.
4. The courts can criticise the constable.
5. The constable is liable to damages.
6. Complaints can be made to the Commissioner of Police and same isinvestigated by the Internal Affairs Branch.
7. Complaint can be. made to the Ombudsman.
8. Use of media.
It is quite apparent from above that the use of discretion by police isunder very strict scrutiny from many angles.
Finally I would like to refer to the untimely death of Inspector J.D.Nesbitt of Prosecuting Branch who was to delivera paper at the seminar. Hehad completed his research and prepared his paper in rough form at the timeof his passing. I am grateful to Inspector C. Naylor ofthc Prosecuting Brunchfor completing the paper and delivering it at the seminar.
 
DlSPENSING WITH THE LAW
T.S. Davidson. QC
Deputy Senior Crown Prosecutor (Companies).
One ofthe complaints made against the Stuart Kings in the l7th Century
was their claim as the fountain of law andjustice to be able to dispense with, in
particular cases or even to suspend altogether, the application of the laws.
These claims were rebutted by the Bill of Rights which helped to establish the
principle of parliamentary sovereignty expressed by Blackstone as follows:
An act of parliament is the exercise of the highest authority that this
kingdom acknowledges upon earth And it cannot be altered,
amended, dispensed with, suspended or repealed, but in the same forms
and by the same authority of parliament.I '
At first sight it might appear to be in derogation of this fundamental
principle of our constitutional law that'the police, considered either as a body
or as individual constables, should have a discretion as to whether or not they
should enforce the law by the institution of criminal proceedings in cases in
which they have, or are likely to be able to present, primafacie evidence of
guilt.2
Among other arguments which have been suggested in opposition to the
existence of such a discretion are that it could lead to partiality and unfair
discrimination by the police and to opportunities for bribery and other
corrupt behaviour; and that members of the public would tend to develop
disrespect for the law and conceive the notion that they too might be justified
in ignoring it if they saw that those charged with its vindication were failing to
do so.3 Neither of these seems to be highly persuasive in denying a measure of
discretion to the police in instituting prosecutions provided it is subject to
adequate legal control so as to be seen to be exercised, not arbitrarily, but on
the basis of fair and rational considerations.
Another, and perhaps more persuasive, reason for arguing against any,
or at least a wide, measure of prosecutorial discretion in the police where
prima facie evidence of guilt is available (and it may be assumed that these
comments are limited to this situation) is that, to the extent to which
discretion is exercised against instituting proceedings it renders redundant the
whole conglomerate‘of criminal courts, judges, crown prosecutors, pa role and
correctional service officers, etc., since it only commences to operate when
triggered by someone, usually the police, instituting a prosecution. Some
might say that this is no bad thing; but for those who retain some faith in the
efficacy of the established system for identifying and dealing with criminality,
it may be regarded as a mark of its inefficiency that the system is capable of
being by-passed by a decision not to set it in motion and which it does not
control.
 
I. l Comm. l85.
2. See Christopher Williams "l’urning a Blind Eye‘ Crim. I,,. R. (I954) 27/.
3. See Williams up. ('iI.
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In the case of trivial offences, particularly where the alleged offender isunlikely to offend again, it may be thought desirable, if only on the score ofeconomy, that the machinery should be left dormant. This argument. ifaccepted, in itselfsuggests that only a limited discretion should be conceded tothe police. It also leaves to them the decision as to when an offence is “trivial“and the assessment of alleged offenders’ potential for (trivial) criminality.Furthermore, to the extent to which the institution of criminal proceedings.albeit for trivial offences. enables the criminal justice system to prescribeassistance and treatment. rather than punishment, the legislative intent maybe thwarted and the alleged offender continue to be deprived. This commentmay be regarded as particularly apt in relation to drug addicts, the mentally ill,etc. .Of this problem the US. President’s Task Force on Crime reported in1966: ‘ '
A major difficulty in the present system of nontrial dispositions is thatwhen an offender is dropped out of- the criminal process by dismissal ofcharges, he usually does not receive the help or treatment-needed toprevent recurrence. A ﬁrst offender discharged without prosecution inthe expectation that his conduct will not be repeated typically is not sentto another agency; in fact, in most communities there are few agenciesdesigned to deal with his problems. Whether mental illness, youth, oralcoholism is the mitigating factor, there rarely is any followup. In thestruggle to reduce the number of cases that compete for attention, thereis little time to consider the needs of those who are dropped out of theprocess.4
Further and, it is submitted, cogent grounds for criticism ofprosec'utorial discretion relate to the manner ofits exercise. The report of theUS. President's Task Force draws attention5 to deficiencies as compared withthe processes of judicial trial i.e. general lack of procedural regularity andparticularly the lack of proced ures for ensuring that the discretion is exercisedon an adequate factual basis both in relation to the alleged offence and thealleged offender. Another U.S. commentator. Professor Joseph Goldstein ofYale Law School, also comments on the lack of publicity inherent in suchdecisions and the consequent lack of review:
These police decisions, unlike their decisions to invoke the law, aregenerally of extremely low visibility and consequently are seldom thesubject of review. Yet an opportunity for review and appraisal of non-enforcement decisions is essential to the functioning of the rule oflaw inour system of criminal justice.6 '
 4. Report of the US. President‘s Task Force on the Courts. Dispositiun Wit/mu! Trial,Ch. 7. p. 6.
5. 0/). ('il. p. l.
6. Professor Joseph (ioldslein ‘l’olicc Discretion not to Invoke the ('iiminnl l’im:i:ss: luwVisibility in the Adminislration (illluslicv‘ ()9 Ya/(' /../. p. 543.
l3
The first general submission of this paper is that the police do have
prosecutorial discretion although there is no statutory authority for its
existence and suchjudicial authority as exists does not identify its formal legal
basis. The justification often given for its existence is based on the common
sense consideration that too much of anything — including law and order ——
may become oppressive. In the words of a US. Judge:
If every policeman, every prosecutor, every court, and every post-
sentence agency performed his or its responsibility in strict accordance
with rules of law. precisely and narrbwly laid down the criminal law
would be ordered but intolerable 7
A similar notion which is said tojustify the assertion of the discretion is
that “successful prosecution is not in itself the end to be sought, but that it is
one of the means of securing the real purpose of a police service, the
prevention of crime”.8 That prosecution is a means to an end rather than an
end in itself ﬁnds support in the House of Lords decision in Smedley L!d.,v.
Breed 9 in which the “public interest”-was said to be the ultimate criterion for
determining whether a prosecution should be instituted by a statutory body
having authority to prosecute under pure foods legislation. lnconveniently,
the main speechin Smedleys case contains a passage which belies the title of
this paper:
The exercise by food and drugs authorities of discretion in the
institution of criminal proceedings and the omission to do so where they
consider that a prosecution will serve no useful purpose is no more the
exercise of a dispensing power than the omission of the law officers, the
Director of Public Prosecutions and the police to prosecute for an ,
offence. l have never heard it suggested that the failure of the police to
prosecute for every trafﬁc offence which Comes to their notice is an
exercise by them ofa dispensing power. No duty is imposed on them to
prosecute in every single case . . .'°
The second general submission ofthis paper, however, is that, with great
respect to their Lordships, the police in exercising discretion against
prosecution are — doubtless with the best of intentions and motives — by-
passing 'the machinery which parliament has, established for the
administration of criminal justice. To the extent to which their decisions are
not controlled by, and reviewable under, the legal system, then they may be
said to be dispensing with the law when they decide not to prosecute.
 
7. Cited in the Report of the US. President‘s Task I’orce 0/). vii. at p. 4.
8. Sir Leonard Dunning H.M. Inspector of Constabulary. England and Walcs‘l)iscrction in
Prosecution‘ 1 Police Jo. 39 ([928) at p. 47.
9. (I974). 2 A.E.R. 2|.
l0. op, cit. per Viscount Dilhorne at p. 33 concurred in by Lord Cross and Lord Kilbrandon at
p. 37.
 
MThe third general submission of this paper is that the existing state of the
law is deﬁcient, in that while assuming the existence of such a discretion:
a. I it fails to identify with adequate precision where, within the police
force, the discretion resides;
b. it fails to deﬁne the ambit of the discretion or state the principles
upon which it should be exercised;
c.' ' it fails to provide procedural checks to ensure that such decisions
. are made on a reasonably adequate factual basis and are, together
with the reasons therefore, adequately recorded so as to be available
for subsequent review; i
d. it fails to lay down with sufficient clarity whether, and if so the
extent to which, such decisions are reviewable by the courts.
The Existence of the Discretion and by whom it~may be Exercised
Clearly there can be no question of discretion to refrain from
, prosecuting unless there is a duty to consider the matter and to prosecute if
that course seems appropriate.
Prior to Smedley's case this question was dealt with by the English Court
of Appeal in litigation involving attempts by Mr. Albert Blackburn M.P.,
acting as a private citizen, to have the London Metropolitan Commissioner of
Police take prosecuting and other action in relation to illegal gambling and the
distribution of pornography. In the ﬁrst of these cases", referred to
hereinafter as Blackburn No. I . Mr. Blackburn sought, inter alia, by an order
of mandamus to have the Commissioner reverse a policy directive to the police
under his control which, and the stated reasons for which, was as follows:
In view of the uncertainty of the law, the expense and manpower
‘ involved in keeping gaming observations in such clubs were notjustified
unless there were complaints of cheating or reason to suppose that a
particular club had become a haunt of criminals.
Although no order was made, because of events which transpired
between the commencement of the hearing ofthe appeal and its decision, each
of the three judgments recognized. although obiter. a duty in the police to
.enforce the law. The Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning said:
I hold it to be the duty of the Commissioner of Police ofthe Metropolis,
as it is of very chief constable, to enforce the law of the land . .. He must
decide whether or not suspected persons are to be prosecuted;'and, if
need be, bring the prosecution or see that it is brought.'2
 
l l. R. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis ex parle Blackburn (I968) 2 QB. I I8 at
p. US.
12. op. oil. at p. L16.-
 
is.
And in Bur-koke v. Greater London Council. Lord Denning saw the
existence of this discretion as not infringing the constitutional prohibition
against dispensing with the law, but as operating by way of qualification to
it.'3
In Blackburn No. 1, Lord Denning also cited Fisher v. Oldham
Corporation” and AG. for N.S.W. v. Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd.'5 as
authority that the Metropolitan Commissioner:
. . . is not the servant of anyone. save of the law itself. No Minister ofthe
Crown can tell him that he must, or must not, keep observation on this
place or that; or that he must, or must not, prosecute this man or that
one.‘6
The decisions cited by His Lordship help to deﬁne the constitutional
position of the police constable at common law as having an authority which
is original and not delegated and which is to be'exercised at his own discretion
by virtue of his holding a public ofﬁce under the Crown.
In N.S.W., the Police Regulation Act, 1899, supplemented by the Rules
made under 5.12 of the Act, provides for the establishment of a disciplined
force with a clear chain of command from Commissioner to constable. Thus.
Rule II (d) provides, inter alia, that each member of the police force
“shall . . . obey all lawful orders from those in authority over him" and s.I4
makes it a summary offence punishable byline for a member of the police
force to, inter alia, “refuse to obey any lawful order".'6
The Act also provides, however, in Section 6(2), that constables shall:
. . . have all such powers, privileges, and advantages and be liable to all
such duties and responsibility as any constable duly appointed now has
or hereafter may have either by the common law or by virtue of any
statute now or hereafter in force in New South Wales (see also Section
27).
Thus, the common law positidn ofthe constable as responsible to no one
“save the law itself“ is retained in N..S.‘W.’7 by provisions’of the same Act
which sets up the elaborate structure of a disciplined force of which the
constable is a member bound to obey all “lawful orders". In the N.S.W.
context this must involve that it is ultimately for the constable to.determine
when an order is “lawful” under Rule ll(d) and by reason of 5.6(2) of the
 
l3. (I97!) I Ch. 655 at p.. 668.
I4. (I930) 2 K.B. 364.
I5. (I955) AC. 457. see also Enever v. The King (I906) 3 C.|..R. 969.
I6. op. cit. I36. He may also be liable to be prosecuted on indictment for the common law
misdemeanour of wilfully neglecting to perform his duty as a public officer: R. v. l)ytham
(I979) 3 W.|..R. 467.
I7. (I955) A.C. 45_7 at p. 480.
m
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Police Regulation Act it will not be lawful if it requires him to do or refrain
from doing that which is inconsistent with the common law notion of his
ofﬁce. In this respect ignorance of the law is no excuse for Rule l l(e)prov1des
that: ‘
he shall be presumed to know his duty in every case, and, unless
otherwise duly directed, is responsible for the due performance thereof.
Although on the face of things all this tends to establish that the
policeman's‘lot is. indeed, an unhappy one. nevertheless, in practice, the.
position generally causes difficulty only for commentators and the like.
Policemen tend to take a much more realistic view. Chief Inspector Oliver of
New Scotland Yard writes:
Superﬁcially the constitutional theory makes it appear that the
Constable enjoys supreme independence in his law enforcement role and
that he is answerable to no one except the Sovereign in her capacity of
“fountain of law". In fact the police in this country are more accountable
and in many ways more subordinate than any other force in the world.
The rank structure, the discipline code and the system of public
complaint ensures that the constable does not administer the law by
whim and it would be idle to pretend that the realities of modern
policing do not effect the constitutional status. The principal advantage
of maintaining a traditional view of the ofﬁce of Constable is that it
ensures that Ministers cannot be accused of using the police force as
another arm of government and there can be no suggestion that political
expediency will inﬂuence the operational independent status of Chief
Officers. By holding that a Constable has original and undelegated
authority it is possible to argue that the public enjoys protection from a
politically untainted force; . . . '8
Notwithstanding this, and specifically in the context of the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, however, Chief Inspector Oliverl9 recognizes the
difﬁculty which can arise from the independent legal status of the constable
where the constable‘s opinion is in conflict with that of his superior as to
whether or not a prosecution should be launched. He refers to a casein which
a constable. not satisfied with a decision of his superior officer that no
prosecution should be initiated, took proceedings in a private capacity which
ended in a conviction. McCardie J. in Fisher v. Oldham Corporation
expressed no doubt as to where the constable‘s duty should lie in such cases:
Suppose that a police officer arrested a man for a serious felony?
Suppose, too. that the watch committee of the borough at once passed a
resolution directing that the felon should be released? Of what value
would such aresolution be? Not only would it be the plain duty ofthe
Hi. “The Ofﬁce of Constable »— I975" ("rim L. R.'(l‘~')75) 3l3 at p. 32L
:9. ('rim. 1.. R. (1975) m op. m. at [7. 3m.
 
l7
police officer to disregard the resolution, but it would also be the duty of
the chief constable to consider whether an information should not at
once be laid against the members of the watch committee for a
conspiracy to obstruct the course of criminal justice.20
Any flutter of anxiety which may be experienced at the thought that
every constable, no matter how junior, may exercise an independent
discretion as to whether a prosecution should be launched, and may ignore
relevant policy decisions laid down for his guidance. is shared by at least one
experienced policeman. Chief Inspector Oliver says: '
The modern “fiction" regarding the office of constable implies that over ,
[00,000 individual police officers in England and Wales exercise
unchallenged discretion in their law enforcement activities. The mere
thought of so much independence and absolute discretion isalien to the
basic concept ofjustice, and one which most police officers would not
consider as viable; the citizen would live in constant fear of uncertain
and indiscriminate law enforcement which would be inequitable, were it
not for guiding policies and procedures laid down by senior ofﬁcers.2|
As a consequence of the provisions of the Police Regulation Ac! these
remarks might be adopted to the situation in New South Wales with equal
force. -
The net result appears to be;
I. there is a discretion residing in the police force in relation to the
institution of prosecutions; '
2. the Commissioner'may issue or authorize policy directives as to
how this discretion should be exercised, but they are not legally
binding on other members of the police force, of and above the
rank of constable, to the extent to which they are inconsistent with
the common law duties and obligations of those members;
3. since the preserved common law status of the constable involves
his being independent and obliged to exercise his ownjudgment as
to whether or not to initiate a prosecution a policy directive may
well prove to be inconsistentwith the constablc's legal duty.
It is submitted:
a. that the common sense argument for some measure ofprosecuting
discretion residing in the police is decisive, but its ambit and
exercise should be subjected to legal control;
 
20. (I930) 2 K.B. 364 at p. 372 cited by the Privy (‘ouncil in AIL/or NS. W. v. I’vrpoluul
'l‘mslee ('0. Ltd. 0/). ('il. at p. 479.
2|. ('rim. I..R. (I975) 3|} at p. 3l4.
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b. unless the constable’s legal position is equated with his situation in
fact, as a member of a disciplined force subject to the guidance and
' command of his superiors, then it may be impossible to devise a
satisfactory set of legal rules to regulate the ambit and exercise of
this discretion;
c. to the extent to which prosecutorial discretion is not regulated
within the legal system then it may be regarded as the resurrection
of a dispensing power. '
The Ambit of the Discretion
Writing in 1928, Sir Leonard Dunning, Her Majesty‘s Inspector of
Constabulary for England and Wales, said that the constable’s discretion is
limited by the terms of his oath of office and by the same legal rules which
limit the private citizen‘s discretion in instituting proceedings for a criminal
offence. ln Sir Leonard's view “the private citizen if he wishes to do so, may
refrain from prosecuting a person whom he knows to have committed an
offence against the criminal law so long as by doing so he' himself does not
offend”.22
The relevant offences which may be committed by a private citizen are
those of compounding and misprision of felony. and breaches of such
provisions as Section l86 of the Crimes Act. Although compounding and
misprision relate only to felonies the circumstances of a particular case may
bring the private citizen within the ambit of the common law misdemeanour,
which applies generally, of attempting to pervert, delay or defeat the course of
justice, either as a substantive offence or as a party to a conspiracy. In
addition, there is the general rule of law that it is unlawful, although not
necessarily criminal, to “stiﬂe a prosecution" by being a party to any
agreement which has the effect of withdrawing it from the ordinary course of
justice. This rule applies even where the balance of public interest weighs in
favour of there being no prosecution and where the consideration is the doing
of that the omission of which is the foundation of the offence alleged. The
rationale of this rule is that such agreements have the effect of usurping a
function of the courts,23 and the rule does not appear to depend upon there
being a prosecution pending at the time of the agreement. but extends to
situations in which one party thereto has primaﬂzcie evidence of an offence
which he agrees to “stiﬂe“ as his part of the bargain although no charge has yet
been laid.24 '
Although in this respect obiler. Smedley's case may be regarded as some
authority for the proposition that the ambit of the discretion ofthe police, in
common with all other prosecuting authorities, is limited‘ only what is
considered by them to. be in the public interest. lfthis be so then Sir Leonard’s
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view can no longer be sustained since the police may properly “stiﬂe a
prosecution" if, on a consideration ofthe relevant circumstances, they think it
in the public interest so to-do. This may be thought to be a reasonably
acceptable state ofthe law depending upon some general agreement as to what
circumstances are to be regarded as properly relevant to the public interest
and the extent to which decisions may be reviewed within the legal system.
in his book The Decision to Prosecute” Mr. A.F. Wilcox, former Chief
Constable of Hertfordshire, lists twenty “Reasons for not prosecuting
Although primafacie evidence of guilt is available". Mr. Wilcox takes care to
explain that these “reasons” are really but factors which he'says should be
Weighed in order to arrive at the ultimate decision.26 Difﬁculty may be
experienced in justifying some of these factors from a strictly legal point of
view although no doubt they have common sense appeal. For example.
number one on the list is “obsolete laws, not repealed but out of tune with
modern thought“. Other similar factors, the application of which' would
appear to demand a nice exercise of judgment by the police are “technical
breaches”; “complexity of the law”; “unpopular laws“ etc. Judgment in
respect of matters such as these seems to involve not only ahigh degree of legal
knowledge and experience but also a highly refined capacity for gauging
current community attitudes. Nevertheless there is a considerable body of
weighty comment which suggests that these and other similar factors relating
to the exercise of discretion may properly be considered by the police.27
The balance of the factors referred to by M r. Wilcox may be regarded as
unexceptionable. Thus to the extent to which they refer to factors personal to
the citizen such as age, physical inﬁrmity, mental condition, etc., they seem
merely to express the notion that the law should be administered humanely;
there is also the practical consideration that public goodwill may be
jeopardized if the aged, the sick and the inﬁrm are indiscrimately prosecuted.
The question of the ambit of the discretion is really determined.
however, by the extent to which it is supervised by, and the exercise of it
reviewable within, the legal system. To the extent to which review is not
available, or is limited, the ambit ofthe discretion will tend to be wide and vice
versa. -
Legal Review of Police Discretion
There are various methods by which the ambit and exercise of the
discretion might be brought within the purview of the legal system. In
Scotland, except in minor cases, prosecutions are initiated by lawyers .who act
independently of the police. Such a system also exists in the USA. Although
it has been recommended that a' similar system should be adopted in England
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27. See e.g. Professor (ilanvillc Williams ‘Discrction in l’rosecuting‘ ('rim. L. R. (I956), p.
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and Wales,” neither the Scottish nor the US. systems appears to contain any
requirement that the police are bound to refer all matters to the appropriate
prosecuting authority," so that there is still room for the exercise of a
discretion which may result in the system of legal control being by-passed.
The Minister in charge of the police might undertake the laying down
and supervision of guidelines for the exercise of prosecuting discretion since
by s.4 of the Police Regulation Act the Commissioner “shall, subject to the
direction of the Minister, be charged with the superintendence of the police
force of New South Wales“. By this means parliament might also be able to
. exercise a measure of control and supervision. This however, might leave the
discretion too much subject to the exigencies of party politics. in any event,
the party system and the encroachment of the Executive may have rendered
parliamentless effective as a watchdog in this as in other respects, whilst too
much overt control of the police by its political head might be regarded as
inexpedient from a number of view points. In addition there is, of course, the
question of the extent to which even a Ministerial directive may be legally
binding on a constable in view of the statutory retention of his common law
status.
As to the course, probably the most effective control exercised to date is
by way of informal critical comment from judgesIn particular cases. Whilst
these comments no doubt have a practical effect on the exercise of police
discretion they have of course, no formal legal effect. The remedy soughtIn
each of the Blackburn cases was an order of mandamus In general such an
order will lie to enforce the performance of a public duty. including a duty to
exercise a discretionprovided the applicant has a sufficient personal interest
in securing its exercise. Although the order will lie to compel the exercise ofan
administrative discretion it will not, in general, issue to direct how it should be
exercised although “failure to exercise" is a relatively wide notion:
Hence where 'an authority has misconceived or misapplied its
discretionary powers by exercising them for an improper purpose, or
capriciously, or on the basis of irrelevant considerations or without
' regard to relevant considerations, it will be deemed to have failed to
exercise its discretion or jurisdiction at all or to have failed to hear and
determine according to law, and mandamus may issue to compel it to act
in accordance with the law.30
Examples given by their Lordships in Blackburn No. 1 as involving clear
cases of failure to exercise discretion were (by Lord Denning“)a directive by a
Chief Constable that no person should be prosecuted for stealing goods less
that £100 in value and (by Salmon Li”) a similar direction that the pOIice
 
28. See (rim. I.. R. (I970). p. 668.
29. Wilcox 0/). (it. p. 9-l0
30. de Smith. Jmliria/ Review afAc/minisirmive Anion (Stevens & Sons; 3rd Edn. I973. at i
p. 485.
3|. (l968)2 QB. ”8 at p. l36.
32. 0]). til. at p. l39.
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should take no steps to prosecute any house-breaker. In these, as well as in the
instant case. their Lordships would have been prepared to construe the
Commissioner‘s decision as a failure to exercise his discretion. ln Blackburn
No. 333 the police had adopted a practise, in relation to allegedly pornographic
material, of obtaining control of it by means ofa warrant to “search and seize”
under an Act which required them thereafter to bring the seized material
before a Justice of the Peace. Instead of doing so, and as a result of a policy
decision. the articles were submitted to the Director of Public Prosecutions
for his advice as to whether or not a prosecution should be insitututed. _The
Metropolitan Commissioner took the view, which was erroneous in law, that ‘
the police had no prosecuting discretion to exercise but were bound to refer all
matters to the Director for his decision. One would have thought Mr.
Blackburn had a strong case to argue that this involved a failure to exercise
discretion by the Commissioner. Nevertheless his application was dismissed,
although on grounds which are difﬁcult. precisely to determine. The court
made it clear, however, that the circumstances are rare in which it will interfere
in such decisions. In the Divisional Court, Lord Widgery C.J., had formulated
the test in terms of whether the Metropolitan Commissioner had “turned his
back on the enforcement of the law"“. This phrase was adopted by Phillimore
LJ. in the Court of Appeal” and the Master of the Rolls cited Blackburn No.
I as authority for the proposition that:
. . . in the carrying out of their duty of enforcing the law, the police have
a discretion with which the Courts will not interfere. There might,
hOWever, be extreme cases in which he was not carrying out his duty.
And then we would.36
If the Courts will seek to review and control the exercise of discretion
only in “extreme cases" or where the person in whom it is vested has “turned
his back on the law”, then the possible ambit of the discretion must be
correspondingly wide allowing the police to dispense with the law on grounds
which might not always meet with unqualified approval.
Although in Blackburn No. l the Court of Appeal made it clear that the
fact that the plaintiff might have instituted a private prosecution was in itself
no bar to the relief sought, a questibn left unresolved wasthat of standing.
This question was raised but not, of course, determined in Blackburn No. 1.
although each of their Lordships expressed doubts as to whether Mr.
Blackburn had a sufficient personal interest to maintain the application. In
Blackburn No. 3 standing appears to have been assumed without argument.
Neither decision can, therefore, be regarded as determinative of the question.
Even a person who acts not from altruistic concern for the public interest as
Mr. Blackburn apparently did, but who asserts injury from alleged criminal
activity which the police decline to presecute may not necessarily, in view of
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the public nature of a criminal prosecution, be in any better position in this
regard. and although it would be open to the Attorney-General to seek judicial
review of a police decision not to prosecute. the practicalities of government
render his doing so remote. Furthermore, if he declines his fiat to permit
relator proceedings at the suit of a private citizen the court will neither review
his decision nor permit a private citizen to maintain the proceedings in spite of
it.37
If the court were to entertain challenges to the exercise of police
discretion to prosecute where they decide not to institute proceedings then it is
difﬁcult to see why such decisions should not be open to challenge where a
prosecution is instituted or proposed to be instituted. This might have the
result of providing a defendant, or prospective defendant, in criminal
proceedings with an avenue for delay and obstruction by resorting to the civil
side of the court. and on the question of standing such a person may be in the
best position to argue a sufﬁcient personal interest to maintain proceedings
for the appropriate form of relief. Such a result would be clearly undesirable
and does not flow from the assumption that judicial review of prosecutorial
decisions by the police is justified as a means of bringing such decisions within
the purview of the legal system. If a prosecution is decided upon then within
the applicable procedural and evidentiary rules it is possible that the decision
to prosecute may be subject to some legal review or at least informal comment
from the bench. If these rules operate to exclude as irrelevant such a limited
review during the course of litigating charges then the defendant may resort to
administrative submission. but using the civil side of the court to interfere in
the workings of the criminal side ought not to be encouraged if expedition in
criminal litigation is thought desirable.
These considerations suggest that it is unlikely that the courts will be
able to develop a satisfactory set of substantive and procedural rules to
provide an appropriate scheme for the review and control of the exercise of
police discretion to prosecute, and that statutory intervention may be
required.
A Suggestion for Reform
’The possible options ofassumption offull Ministerial responsibility, the
introduction of a system modelled on the Scottish, and a head ofjudicial
review expanded by statute have already been referred to. Professor Joseph
Goldstein of the Yale Law School has also promoted some interesting ideas on
the subject of reform.38 -
In the ﬁrst place he advocates as the ideal a system requiring the police
to follow a policy of full enforcement of the law with no prosecutorial
discretion except such as “cannot be completely eliminated where human
beings are involved". This in itself it is submitted. is a perfectly defensible
policy. He accepts, however, that such a policy “would be neither workable
 
37. Gauriel v. Union of Pox! Office Workers (I977) 3 A.E.R.‘70.
38. 69 Yale I.../. op. cit. at p. 586 el. seq.
23
nor humane nor humanly possible under present conditions . . . and
suggests that, for the meantime, there should be established State Policy
Appraisal and Review Boards consisting of the Attorney-General, the Chief
Justice. the Police Chief, correctional and parole chiefs, etc. Their functions
would be to “ . . . review. appraise, and make recommendations concerning
municipal police non-enforcement policies as well as follow up and review the
consequences of implemented proposals“. The end sought would be the
development of a prosecutorial policy which, because framed and reviewed by
a body of such profound and diverse experience, would be more likely to be
attuned to a broader range of the basic pt'irposes of the criminal law; it would V
also be of higher “visibility" and subject to external review and amendment.
Although it may be suggested ‘that in some respects Professor
Goldstein‘s Boards are over-elaborate for the New South Wales context,
having regard to. the ends sought to be achieved. the idea of establishing a
group of the expertise and standing suggested. which would have power to
review (implying a requirement that adequate records are to be kept by the
police of their prosecuting decisions) and to establish prosecuting policy, is
surely worthy of careful consideration.
lf such a Board, or Committee, were to be set up in New South Wales
then it might also be made obligatory upon it to report periodically to
parliament both at the stage at which policy was set and following upon a
review of the ‘operation of that policy from time to time..
Such a scheme would appear to offer the advantages of:
a. permitting a more comprehensive prosecution policy to be devised
for the State which would reflect the views of other component parts
of the criminal justice machinery than the police;
b. providing a body of review to which the Commissioner would be‘
accountable;
c. avoiding any possible suggestion of undesirable executive
interference in the operation ofthe police. whilst allowing parliament
to exert overall supervision of prosecuting policy.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
'I'.S. Davidson. Q.( '.
In deference to a remark in Mr. Nyman’s comments to the effect that
some people may think this topic a little academic. I should start by assuring
you that I am not ofthat view. I think it is a very important topic indeed, and it
has been described by no less a personage than the Director of Public
Prosecutions in England, who ought to know something about the matter. as
the most important aspect of the system of the administration of criminal
justice. That being so, it seems to meto follow that it should be a matter which
is the subject of some sort of legal supervision or control. In other words it
should be part of the machinery for the administration of criminal justice and
subject to some of the assumptions which are basic to that system.
A discretion to prosecute should have at least three characteristics:
ﬁrStly, uniformity of application; secondly, a requirement that each decision
should be adequately recorded (not only as a decision but as to the reasons for
it); and thirdly, there should be some method by which the decision made by
the police can be reviewed. These decisions can be considered in two
categories. The first category. which includes most of the decisions made by
the police is whether or not to prosecute, which is a decision based solely on
the adequacy or otherwise of the available evidence. In the great number of
cases, which fall to the police to decide as to whether or not there should be a
prosecution, that is the sole and only criterion. It is in the other category,
however, of those cases in which there is seen to be sufficient evidence to
support a prosecution but where other considerations are thought to require a
decision not to prosecute that the problems really arise.
As to the first category it seems to me to be obvious that there should be
no prosecution of any citizen unless someone has formed the view that there is
sufficient evidence to justify it. Obviously it would be grossly improper to put
a man to the expense, which may well be the least disadvantageous
consideration. of defending a criminal trial unless it has been determined that
there is evidence to support it. The question that arises. however, under that
category is whether or not we should have a system (something akin to the
Scottish system) in which a body of independent lawyers makes the decision to
prosecute or not to prosecute on the basis of material presented to them by the
police. For a number of reasons. three in particular, I have formed the view
that this suggestion ought not to be adopted. If it was to include all the
offences which the police normally decide upon and deal with from day to day.
it would involve a body ofenormous size that would require a plentiful supply
of lawyers experienced in the criminal law. It would seem to require the
exclusion, therefore, of a category of offences which we would have to
describe as “minor offences". Here we would fall into the perennial problem of
deﬁnition and, of course, it would leave open the problem of the police
discretion in relation to “minor offences". Secondly, and this has been the
experience as I understand it of others writing on this subject, such asystem is
too easily by-passed simply by the police — where they are determined there
ought not to be a prosecution — failing to submit the matter to the lawyers. If
it can be by-passed as easily as that, then effectively it seems to me to leave a
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large measure of uncontrolled discretion in the hands of the police. And
thirdly, if I understand the view as stated in the President‘s Task Force Report
published in 1966 correctly, the system does not seem to work very well in the
United States.
l am of the view that this category of case, that is to say the ordinary run
of the mill case in which the only criterion for decision is the availability ofa
sufficiency of evidence, ought to remain with the police provided that the
ultimate decision is made by an ofﬁcer of sufficiently high rank who is also not
, a person engaged in the actual investigation. I have no doubt that people who
do spend a lot of time and a lot of effort investigating an offence naturally
become rather wedded to the idea that their work ought to be recognised in the
form of prosecution, so that I would think that it would be desirable for the
police to have a decision made ultimately by somebody of relatively high rank
and who is not engaged in the investigation. Indeed, I think the police already
adopt this practice. Secondly, that as a condition upon which this category of
case might be left with the police it ought to be sufﬁciently documented and
recorded so that it can be reviewed if necessary at some later stage. And
thirdly, and this is of particular relevance to the position in New South Wales,
that in borderline cases resort ought to be had to the avenues for legal advice
which exists for the police, say through the Crown Solicitors Ofﬁce and to the
Crown Prosecutors through the appropriate avenue. This may well be the
practice.
It is in the second category of case that I see that the real problems arise,
that is in those cases where there is sufﬁcient evidence but for one reason or
another it is decided that there should be no prosecution. Here a number of
important questions deserve consideration. Firstly, is there a discretion in
these circumstances for the police not to prosecute, or are they obliged in all
cases in which they have a sufficiency of evidence to lay charges? Secondly, if
there is such a discretion should it be abolished, and some such system as the
mandatory system to which Dr. Certoma refers introduced? Thirdly, by
whom is this discretion to be exercised? Is it for everyjunior constable to make
up his mind ultimately on whether or not there should be a prosecution in a
particular case, or is he legally bound (we know that he is bound factually) to
accept guidelines and policies laid down by his superiors? Fourthly, on what
grounds ought this discretion to be exercised and who is to decide what are the
appropriate grounds for exercise of this discretion? Should it be left to the
Commissioner of Police to determine and dictate a prosecution policy for the
State or should other voices with an interest in the creation of that policy be
also heard? And finally, to whom if anyone are the police answerable for
decisions not be prosecute where evidence of guilt is available?
Taking these matters in order I would suggest that there obviously is
such a discretion, and I certainly would not advocate that there be no such
discretion. There are obvious and, it seems to me, cogent reasons why the
police should not be expected to drag along to court every citizen in relation to
whom they have evidence sufﬁcient to support a prosecution. I think in so far
as the material that l have been able to read is concerned there is almost
unaminous agreement with this, the outstanding dissension being Professor
Goldstein of the Yale Law School.
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Assuming that there is this discretion, whose discretion is it? It seems to
be terribly unfortunate that in New South Wales we have a statute of
outstanding ambiguity. I am sure we have more than one, but, in this context,
we have one in the Police Regulation Act. Whilst it provides for a disciplined
tiered structure for the police force with authority extending from the
Minister down to the constable it also provides for a saving of the Common
Law powers of the constable. Inspector Nesbitt in his paper set out a passage
from the Privy Council decision in the Attorner-General for New South
Wales and 77w Perpetual Trustee Company Limiled in which the constable is
described as having an authority which is original, not delegated. and is
exercised at this own discretion by virtue of his office (page 36). The result
seems to me to be that we have as well as this tiered disciplined structure for
the police provided for in the Police Regulation Act. the very self same Act
provides, at least legally if not in practice, a “Mexican Army" type situation in
which every man is his own General or, at least, his own Colonel. Even if he be
the mostjunior constable in the force he can determine whether or not there is
to be a prosecution in a particular case and can legally ignore guidelines laid
down for his assistance by the Commissioner.(0bviously this does not happen
in practice.) This seems to be obviously undesirable and it should be rectiﬁed.
It should be quite clearly stated in the Act that in this and in other respects the
constable is subject to direction and control of his superiors; in other words
the factual and the legal situation should be equated.
Assuming that the Commissioner has this power to issue legally, as well
as factually, binding directives in order to achieve uniformity which, as I
suggested, is one of the desirable characteristics of a logical prosecution
policy, he ought to use it to lay down guidelines for the assistance of those
under his control. It seems to me that this raises the two further questions that
l have adverted to, that is should the determination of the State's prosecuting
policy be left to the sole discretion of the Commissioner, or should other
voices concerned with the administration of criminal justice be heard in the
framing of that policy, and secondly, should the Commissioner be
accountable for carrying into effect the policy so determined. if so, to whom
and to what extent?
Firstly, as to the content of the prosecuting policy, the argument against
imposing on the Commissioner a policy which would be determined, at least
in part, by outsiders is that this would involve a diminution of his authority to
control and supervise the Police Force. Certainly any prosecution policy
which tended to interfere with the way in which he disposed of the manpower
available to him or even which tried to impose on him a system of priorities
would be. or might be regarded as, an undue restriction on his authority and.
of course. any sensible prosecution policy laid down would have to recognise
that he has not got unlimited resources. But in simply settinga body ofcriteria
to which reference might be made by the Commissioner and the people under
his control. and which would govern the making of decisions whether or not In
prosecute in cases which are not to be governed Solcly by the availability of
evidence would not be or involve any undue restriction the Commissioner‘s
authority. I would suggest for consideration that it is not unreasonable to
propose, as Professor (ioldstein has proposed, that when arriving at a sensible
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prosecution policy other voices than the Commissioner’s ought to be heard
and I will refer to that later after I have dealt with this question of
accountability
Once the policy has been determined it seems to me that it would be
rather futile not to have the Commissioner account for its implementation to
somebody and, at least, to some extent. The question is to whom should he be
answerable, and at first sight the answer is a very easy one — obviously, he
should be answerable to his Minister like every other departmental head. As a
result of our Westminister system he should be answerable to his Minister for
this and other aspects of his administration and the Minister is then in turn
subject to the scrutiny of Parliament. That is the obvious answer to the
question. But the extent to which the Minister should involve himself in the
detail of police affairs requires the balancing of that consideration against
another consideration because our traditions are opposed to even the
appearance of there being a political police force. I should not think there
would be many people who would want to see a police force that was not
independent in the sense that it served the community irrespective of who
happened to be in power at any particular time. The Minister in charge of the
policy may himself be unwilling, because of this demand in the community, to
involve himself or be seen to be involving himself too closely or in too much
detail in the day to day running of the police force, including the laying down
or reviewing ofa prosecution policy. I would suggest that accountability to the
“Minister is likely to be more apparent than real.
The next question is what is the function of the courts? Can we rely upon
those courts with such remedies that litigants may have available to them to
provide an effective arena for the review ofthe implementation ofprosecuting
policy? Certainly the Blackburn cases which I have referred to in the paper
(pages 20-22) suggest that supervision by the courts would not be effective.
They do indicate, and I say this again in deference to remarks made by Mr.
Nyman, that the argument of the availability of a private prosecution is not a
valid argument for suggesting that the courts would be an inadequate arena
for review.
Assuming then that neither Minister nor the courts are to be the head of
review for the creation of policy laid down for the determination of
prosecution discretion that leaves for consideration a solution along the lines
suggested by Professor Goldstein. That is to say that both the content and the
review of prosecuting policy might be undertaken by a committee on which
there15 represented all or at least a substantial number of thecomponent parts
of the criminal justice machinery including, of course, the police. I would
envisage that there might be represented on such a Committee the Minister in
charge of police, the Attorney-General, the judges of both the Supreme and
the District courts, the magistrates, the police and the probation and the
parole service and its ﬁrst task would be to set a policy for the Commissioner.
This policy once set would be the subject of a Report to Parliament with
opportunity for debate and amendment, and that once the policy was remitted
to the Commissioner as the policy for the time being a date might be set (say
twelve months) for review of that policy. The Committee might be empowered
to call upon the Commissioner to produce his records, and that implies, of
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course. that there would have to be a sufficient and adequate documentation
of each decision that they might be reviewed. The review would then be the
subject of a further Report to Parliament so that any criticism or pats on the
head for the Commissioner might be made publicly known
,1 would suggest that the advantages of a scheme such as this would be
threefold. It would permit a more comprehensive prosecuting policy to be
compiled reﬂecting as it would most of the components of the criminaljustice
machine and not just one part of it, namely the police, and it would provide an
independent body of review to which the Commissioner would be
accountable. Of course, he would be part of that independent body of. review
himself but I would not think this would be any disadvantage, there would be
only advantage to be had from that fact. And ﬁnally, on this sort of body there
could be no suggestionof any political interference with the police. Obviously a
it is composedof too many disparate elements to provide any grounds for that
sort of criticism.
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COMMENTARY
Trevor Nymari. LL. B.
Solicitor, Supreme Court of N.S.W.
The right of any citizen of New South Wales to lay. an Information
before a justice alleging that a crime has been committed. is the fundamental
procedural basis for commencement ofcriminal proceedings. M r. Davidson's
emphasis is on the decision whether or not to lay the Information and criteria
which ought to be taken into account. There are checks and safeguards against
capricious or malicious prosecutions —- e.g. suits for damages, orders for
costs, nolliprosequi by the Attorney-General, and the adverse commentary of
the court. Thus there is a reluctance to lay a charge —— by police, government
authority or citizen — unless there is available evidence to prove a prima facie
case. The police officer who charges a citizen with larceny and cannot produce
prima facie proof that the defendant committed the crime runs the risks of:-
" an adverse report from the courtroom to his superiors;
‘ an order against himself personally for costs;
‘ a suit against himself personally for wrongful arrest/ malicious
prosecution
‘ damage to his reputation and future credit.
These then, are practical considerations weighing on the mind of the law
enforcement ofﬁcer when he makes his decision whether to charge or not to
charge. To lay a charge means he accepts the risks. In the overwhelming
majority ofcases, refraining from laying a charge means he does not accept the
risks. In cases where a crime has certainly been committed but there is doubt
about the identity of the offender, the investigating officer makes a decision
that there is insufﬁcient evidence of identity to charge the suspect. In cases
where there is doubt whether the provable behaviour of a certain person
constitutes a crime (e.g. whether or not to lay a charge of culpable driving
DMD) the investigating officer makes a decision that there is insufficient
evidence of criminality (e.g. of dangerous manner of driving).
Now, if the risks are taken, the criminal process takes its course. Mr.
Davidson points to the cases where the risks are not taken, and asks the
question “Why?” We are all familiar with the stories of lucky motorists who
are not “breached” for negligent driving after a motor accident, when the
police ofﬁcer could very easily have given them one. At the other end of the
spectrum is the motorist who only is “breached” for negligent driving when the
police officer could very easily have charged him with culpable driving DM D.
The decision not to prosecute is more important than the decision to do so, he
argues, becauseit is not normally subjected to public scrutiny. An interesting
additional feature18 the lack of obvious testing ground for the decision not to
prosecute. Whereas the defendant whoIS wrongly prosecuted has his obvious
remedies, the complainant for whom the police will not lay a prosecution has
not obvious remedies. He can lay his own Information but must prosecute at
his own expense, so that is cold comfort. The difference between the merchant'
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for whom the police will act as debt collector of bad cheques and the merchant
for whom the police wont, appears to be a very important difference of
advantage.
Whilst these distinctions might appear to be of critical significance, there
is a doubt in my mind concerning the practical application of the distinctions
in fact. ls the issue of academic interest only? And if it is a real practical
problem, can it be resolved by a practical solution? This seminar should not
recommend the establishment of bureaux and supervisory bodies which
create further drain on public funds with no appreciable improvement in
standards of detection, denunciation and prevention of crime.
I am going to pose three questions for your further consideration, in
relation to the application of the theories Mr. Davidson has expounded.
One question is whether the problem is apparent or real. By this I mean
whether there is really a problem at all in the matter. Remember that:—
‘ there is a right in every citizen to be an informant and thereby to
invoke the criminal process;
‘ police constables are personally committed to the prosecution of
offences, once there is evidence;
’ the police force as a whole is subjected by Statute to a chain of
command whereby any neglect on the part of apolice officer is
subject to punishment by departmental tribunal;
." corrupt practices on the part of police are punishable by criminal, as
well as departmental, proceedings;
" the facilities for complaints against police have recently been
expanded to provide easier and more thorough investigation of
allegations of any kind against police;
" there is no statute of limitations upon prosecutions for indictable
offences and if one police officer fails to, another police ofﬁcer can.
Therefore it is unlikely that a police officer will fail to prosecute in
circumstances where he ought to. and if he does, he can be disciplined and the
offence can be prosecuted by another officer.
The second question is whether Mr. Davidson has really got to the nub
of the issue, namely accountability. He has made a proposal for a Policy
Appraisal and Review Board to-lay down criteria for non-prosecution. I
support the idea of police being given clear instructions on the criteria to be
applied on the question of whether or not to prosecute. But laying down
criteria is not the issue. The real issue is accountability; namely are the criteria
being applied?
It seems to me that the mischief M r. Davidson is concerned about is the
case of a police ofﬁcer, who has good grounds to lay a charge, neglecting to do
.
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so through laziness. negligence or motive of gain. 'l‘o face this mischief, what is
needed is a police force within the police force. I would like to take a moment
to examine the practical implications of this.
Firstly, it would not serve the purpose for a police officer from the same
squad or division to check his workmate's decision. He might be too close to
the problem to be above covering up his friend's misdeeds. However the
decision (to prosecute or not to prosecute) must be made on the spot in most
cases, because it involves a decision whether or not to exercise the power of
arrest Thisis not a Statein which arrest can be carried today and the charge
be laid tomorrow or next week— in the meantime a DPP or State Attorney
giving advice on the form of indictment.
Secondly, the police force within the police would need to be better
lawyers, better detectives and themselves utterly uncorruptable The cream of
the police department would need to be allocated to the duty of “rakingover
the embers” of their less talented brethren
The third question is how wide should the net go? Should a report be.
submitted on every suspect? As an example of the practical problem, there are
45 members of the Drug Squad at the moment; On an average day, they would
7 interview about 100 persons. Not all of the persons interviewed is a suspect for
a particular offence, but most of them have attracted interest for the reason
that they might be‘ drug offenders.
As another example, mysterious crimes sometimes have many suspects.
Unsolved murders may have 20 or many more. Consider the ramiﬁcations ofa
report on every suspect; 20 or more analyses of the crime from the point of
view of whether there is a case against each person. Each report to be looked at
separately with a close examination of the statements obtained. Instance the
typical housebreaking report Itis seldom the subject of lengthy investigation
but the houseowners, neighbours, local hoodlums and enemies of the family '
are all suspects. Should each of them be the subject of a report to some
superior, as to why each one has not been charged?
Conclusion
As far as l aware, there are no specific criteria laid down for law
enforcement authorities to observe in the exercise of a discretion not to 4
' prosecute. I agree with the proposition that criteria should be laid doWn
clearly.
As far as policing 'these criteria, 1 am of the 'opinion that the police
disciplinary system is adequate. to cope.
l
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Trevor Nyman
Firstly I want to emphasise that as I see the subject for debate tonight the
concentration of attention should not be upon the exercise of discretion to
prosecute but should be on the exercise of discretion not to prosecute. As has
already been stated in the paper of Mr. Davidson once the criminal process
has been invoked then the exercise of discretion comes under the scrutiny of
the judicial process and through that it comes under public scrutiny. The real
emphasis in this seminar must therefore be upon the issue of non-prosecution.
This is the situation when the attention of the police is drawn to a grievance
real or imagined by a citizen. It is the situation where arguably a criminal
charge might be laid. It is the situation where a police ofﬁcer makes a positive
decision that he will not prosecute. As I see it the categories in which this will
take place are three.
Firstly, where the police make the decision that the facts supplied do not
constitute a criminal offence but constitute a civil wrong. For example, in an
assault alleged to have been committed in a private place the police will advise
perhaps the person who says he is aggrieved to take private action. Another
example is the situation where the police decline to be the informant in a
situation alleged by security officers to constitute shoplifting in a retail store.
The second category ofcases where the police exercise a discretion not to
'prosecute is where a crime has certainly been committed, for example a
mysterious murder. An investigation results in suspicions against several
persons. Famous examples are the unsolved murders of Bogle and Chandler.
and the more recent unsolved murder of Juanita Ncilson. In the latter case
there are many suspects but in the earlier case there are few. It is interesting to
speculate what would have happened in the Bogle-Chandler mystery if one or
more of the suspects were charged with the murder, as presumably (from the
paper of Dr. Certoma) would have occurred if it had happened in Italy.
However nobody was charged and the matter remains an example of non-
_prosecution by the police for want of evidence of the identity of the
offender.
Mr. Davidson said, on page 25, that nobody would suggest a person
should be charged unless there was sufficient evidence to ground the charge,
but you might think he was begging the question by saying that. Who makes
the decision about whether there is enough evidence for the person to be
charged? The police officer does — and there he goes again exercising his
discretion.
The third category where the police exercise a discretion not to
prosecute is where they exercise a discretion to lay a lesser charge where a
more serious charge might lie. lfthe lesser charge laid is an indictable one then
it is open to the committing magistrate at the close of the committal
proceedings to lay a more serious charge. However, ifthe charge the police lay
in the first place is a summary charge the magistrate does not have this power.
A typical example is the driver involved in a serious accident. Another
example is the charge of “goods in custody" which can be laid by the police
where perhaps a charge of stealing or even “break enter and steal" might have  
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been laid. Such situations are different from the ones that l have previously
outlined because at least in the circumstances the charge comes before the
scrutiny of a criminal court. Nevertheless, it is open to the police to inform the
court of only the matters which substantiate the charge that was laid. and not
to inform the court of the matters which might have substantiated a more '
serious charge.
These then are the three categories which I see as being the theoretical
circumstances in which it is open to the police to exercise a discretion not to
prosecute in circumstances which we might regard as against the public
interest. These are the circumstances which this seminar should consider as
being the mischief, if any, which ought to be countered.
I would like to turn now to the paper of Dr. Certoma. He informs us that
Article 112 of the Italian Constitution requires that a prosecution must be
commenced in which a breach of the criminal law comes to the notice of the
prosecutor. If I interpret this correctly it would mean that the Italian situation
is different from the New South Wales situation in the respect that somebody
would by now have been charged as the principal in the Juanita Neilson
murder. This would mean, I suppose, that a person charged would have been
acquitted on the grounds that there would have been no prima facie case or a
reasonable doubt. It would also mean that there would have been great
expense to the public and costs of the legal representatives of the defence
because, in this situation, legal aid would have been granted, or, if it was not
availed of, costs would possibly be awarded if the evidence was demonstrably
insufficient to constitute a case. Thus on the credit side the Italian example
gains the public scrutiny of the investigations but loses substantial public
funds in the exercise. I have used the example of a murder case which perhaps
is a poor example. In the case of mysterious deaths a far more public scrutiny
takes place in the Coroner's Court in New South Wales which includes not
only the evidence against a person who might be accused but whatever
evidence has been accumulated by the whole investigation. I am very strongly
persuaded that there can be no improvement on the question of discretion in
the criminal process where the crime being investigated is murder I believe
that the inquisitorial procedures of the Coroner’s Court provide adequate
public scrutiny of the matter and especially adequate public scrutiny of the
police discretion not to prosecute
Having studied the problemin what I believe to be its three parts I must
now emphasise that I regard it as more apparent than real lam not saying that
it is academic, lam saying apparent rather than real What I now want to say is
intended to contrast the theoretical dilemma with the reality in which there is
no dilemma. Like the poor who are alWays with us we are always going to have
some measure ofdiscretion vested in the police. Your most obvious example is
the highway patrolman who speaks to you about some questionable driving a
short while back. He might give you a ticket or he might not; he has executed a
discretion to prosecute or not to prosecute.
In my paper I have referred to remedies which are available to persons
who are aggrieved by the failure of police to prosecute. The police ofﬁcer who
fails to prosecute as a result of unwOrthy motives must successfully sail
through dangerous waters which these remedies represent and my friends in
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the police point out to me that even if Inspector Nesbitt’s reference to the
Ombudsman might be a little extravagant the procedures involved in making
a complaint to an Ombudsman are very simple. It is also important to stress
that the disciplinary system within the police department is extremely
efficient. From the local complaint made to the Inspector by a cells prisoner
who claims to have been assaulted by the police to the higher level complaint
to the Internal Affairs Branch, special priority is given by senior police to any
allegations of improper conduct by members of the police department
whether that conduct constitutes a criminal offence or only a breach of Police
Instructions.
The next practical hurdle to get over in considering the theoretical
mischief we are debating is the vast number of cases of a suspicion of
criminality as against the small number of police to investigate them. For
example one of the ramifications of the widespread use of drugs in the
community has been the fact that the drug squad is quite unable to cope with
the tremendous amount of drug offences being committed in this State. Thus,
in a single day members ofthe drug squad may speak to a very large number of
people about whom they have suspicions but because of the lack of time they
cannot thoroughly investigate the suspect and obtain the evidence which
would prove an offence. So you have a situation ofthe police being suspicious
of the commission of the crime, or even having knowledge of the commission
of a crime, but through lack of time they are unable to obtain the evidence to
have the offender dealt with. Nor is this problem confined to the sphere of
drug offences. I believe that New South Wales Metropolitan Police have only
a 20% record of clear ups of house breakings. There is very little that divisional
detectives can do about solving them given their heavy committment to
investigation of other crimes. Many housebreaking offences however are
committed by youngsters residing in the very neighbourhood where the
offences take place. Given time, local police could solve them. The additional
manpower which would need to be injected is purely a matter for speculation,
but keep in mind what I have said about additional divisional detectives as l
will return to that matter.
One solution for the mischief we have been talking about would be to
have police officers allocated to rake over the coals of investigations carried
out by other police. I have mentioned in my paper they would need to be men
of special talent and experience. There would also need to be a very large
number of them. I might mention in passing that such a supervisory squad
would also be exercising discretion, which would include discretion not to
prosecute and so we get back to the same problem. However, let me say that
the additional manpower such a squad of supervisors would entail would not
only bleed the police force of its best investigators but would also entail taking
men from other jobs or alternatively recruiting more police. If more funds
were to be allocated for the recruitment of more men then we come to an
important question of principle. I turn your mind back to the question of
manpower. What would you prefer? More divisional detectives or a squad of
supervisors. The same argument applies if the supervisory officers come from
outside the police department. Should available funds be spent on
investigators or on supervisors?
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On the enquiries which I have made on the preparation for this seminar
and in my experience as a criminal lawyer in this city I have beenunable to
obtain any consistent version of the extension of supervision by senior
detectives to the work of junior detectives. In some squads and divisions one
hears complaints that you cannot go to the toilet without the boss’s permission
and that the boss needs to know what you were doing every minute of the day.
In other parts of our plainclothes police force the senior detectives are busy in
their own ﬁeldwork and spend little time in supervising other detectives in
their division. This is particularly noticeable in the country. My conclusion is
that more careful guidelines should be laid down in relation to the supervision
by senior officers of junior officers and I agree with the comments of Greg
Woods that the Police Instructions be made public. From what I know of
them the Police Department has every reason to be proud ofthem and there is
no reason for them to be shrouded in secrecy.
In the recommendations of Judge Adrian Roden, as he then was, on the
fundamental restructuring of the criminal law there are two chapters I would
like to mention. One is the framing of indictments in a way which makes the
general allegation first and then alleges aggravating factors after. For
example, instead of a charge of malicious wound with intent to murder the
charge would be assault with aggravating factors as follows (a) with a weapon,
(b) causing a wound, (c) with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, (d) with
intent to murder. If this procedural change were adopted it would certainly
assist in eliminating one at least of the discretionary exercises of non
prosecution. The second recommendation of the Roden paper to which I
would refer is in relation to police powers. His Honour recommended
legislation defining by statute not regulation the powers of police. This should
in my view he an appropriate location for the guidelines I have spoken of in my
paper.
The Law Society of New South Wales has commended the Roden paper
to the Attorney-General as a basis for the preparation for new legislation on
criminal law covering both substantive and procedural aspects.
In summary, Mr. Davidson and myself agree upon the laying down for
criteria for non prosecution. Implementation of that policy gets back to the
problem of discipline within the Police Department.
I wish to thank the Institute for letting me express my views and to
congratulate M r. Davidson on the learned and stimulating paper which I may
say is a typical example of the excellence of his work as a criminal lawyer.
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DISCRETION: A MATTER FOR THE POLICE
J. D. Nesbitt‘
Inspector of Police,
Police Prosecuting Branch
Police discretion in the criminal process commences consciously or
unconsciously'from the moment a policeman is confronted with a situation,
that may or may not be an offence or crime against the law requiring his
attention.
All members of the Police Force have a duty to carry out the primary
objects of the Force which are stated as:-
The protection of life and property, the prevention of crime, the
detection and bringing to justice of offenders and the preservation of
order.l
Unlike most positions, no person appointed to be a member of the
Police Force shall be capable of holding such ofﬁce or of acting in any way
therein until he has taken and subscribed to such oath. This oath is re-
produced as follows:- -
1, AB. do swear that I will well and truly serve our Sovereign Lady the
Queen in the Ofﬁce of Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Senior
Assistant Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner, superintendent,
inspector, sergeant, or constable of police (as the case may be), without
favour or affection, malice or ill-will, for the period of from this date,
and until I am legally discharged, that I will see and cause Her Majesty's
peace to .be kept and preserved, and that I will prevent to the best of my
power all offences against the same, and that while I continue to hold the
said ofﬁce I will to the best of my skill and knowledge discharge all the
duties thereof faithfully according to law. So help me GOD.2
The decision of the Privy Council in the Attorney-General for New
_ South Wales and the Perpetual Trustee Company Limited stated:-
There is a fundamental difference between the domestic relation of
servant and master and that of the holder ofa public office and the State
which he is said to serve. The Constable falls within the latter category.
His authority is original, not delegated by virtue of his Ofﬁce: he is a
ministerial ofﬁcer exercising statutory rights independently ofcontract.
The essential difference is recognized in the fact that his relationship to
the Government is not in ordinary parlance described as that of servant
and master}
 
'This paper was written by the late Inspector Nesbitt and presented by Inspector C. L. Naylor,
Assistant Ofﬁcer, Police Prosecuting Branch of the N.S.W. Police Department.
Police Rules Part IX
Police Regulation Act. I899. Section 9
92CIR p. ll3at I29
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This cannot be said of many other Police Forces particularly in Europe
where a police ofﬁcer acts as an agent of the State.
Section 352 of the Crimes Act of New South Wales broadens the
common law powers of arrest so that a Constable or a private person may
arrest without warrant. Subsection (2) gives a constable additional power to
arrest any person suspected of having committed an offence. ItIS appropriate
to set out those powers in full.
352. (I)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Any constable or other person may without warrant
apprehend,
(a) any person \in the act of committing, or immediately
after having committed, an offence punishable,
whether by indictment, or on summary conviction,
under any Act,
(b) any person who has committed a felony for which he
has not been tried,
and take him, and any property found upon- him, before a
Justice to be dealt with according to law.
Any constable may without warrant apprehend,
(a) any person whom he, with reasonable cause, suspects
of having committed any such offence or crime,
(b) any person lying, or loitering, in any highway, yard, or
other place during the night, whom he, with reasonable
cause, suspects of being about to commit any felony.
and take him, and any property found upon him, before a
Justice to be dealt with according to law
Any constable may, although the warrant is not at the time
in his possession, apprehend any person for whose
apprehension for a misdemeanour, or an offence punishable
misdemeanour, a warrant has been issued, and take him,
and any property found upon him, before a Justice to be
dealt with according to law.
Any constable may, although the warrant is‘not at the time
in his poSsession, apprehend any person for whose
apprehension on any ground other than a charge of felony
or misdemeanour or offence punishable as a misdemeanour
a warrant has been lawfully issUed, provided the issue of
such warrant has been certified by telegraph by the
Commissioner of Police Or by the Justice who has signed
such warrant.‘ .
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The section clearly vests a discretionary power in a constable to arrest or
refrain from arresting as it does a citizen. The common law also admits a
discretion to a constable to abstain from arrest. This circumstance is clearly
distinguishable from the lack of discretion given to police in many other parts
of the world, e.g. Italy.
The words ofSir Henry Hawkins ring clearly in the minds of police when
he said:-
If one person wishes to give another into your custody for felony, you
are not absolutely bound to arrest. You ought to exercise your
discretion having regard to the nature of the crime, the surrounding
circumstances, and the condition and character of the accuser and the
accused.“
It might be appropriate at this stage to give an example of the type of
incident that could arise any day in the life ofa policeman. Take the situation
ofajuvenile found with an implement smashing a parking meter. Quite apart
from the constable’s concern that a breach of the law has occurred, he could
well question the reason for the juvenile's action. ls he simply doing it out of
spite. ls he endeavouring to gain access to the coin inside the meter? The
constable's training will cause him to question thejuvenile’s age and naturally
if the offender is between the age of IO and 14 years (as the law applies in the
State of New South Wales) has he sufficient mental capacity to form the
necessary state of mind to know that what he was doing was wrong?
Very well then, what courses of action are open to the constable facing
this type of situation? Bearing in mind, the duty of a member of the Police
Force to protect life and property. he would firstly prevent further damage
being occasioned to the meter by taking the implement away from the
offender. He would then seek to question thejuvenile to ascertain his identity,
his age, his mental capacity, and the reason for his conduct.
Assuming that thcjuvenile remained silent or gave a doubtful answer in
relation to his age, would this prevent the constable from further investigating
or restraining the young person? For the purpose of this exercise let us accept
that the juvenile was, in fact, only nine years of age. The constable would be
entitled to take him to :1 Police Station and make further inquiries to ascertain
or confirm the truth of his answers. It could well be that the constable might
consider taking action against the young person for being neglected or
uncontrollable. Subsequent inquiries may show that the individual has come
from a good home where he has been properly cared for and could not be
con:.idered uncontrollable. The constable would then be able to release him
into the hands of his parents, the question of compensation to the parking
meter being dealt with quite outside the ambit of the criminal law.
If the offender was, in fact, over ten years of age and the constable was
able to establish the necessary mental capacity, then depending upon the
antecedents of the individual concerned several courses would be open to the
constable. He could either cause a charge to be preferred or summons the
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young person for the appropriate offence or submit a report to his officer with
a recommendation for a caution to be administered if it was considered that
this was the best course most favourable to the individual concerned.
ln all of the constable‘s actions he exercises an individual discretion,
considering not only the welfare of the individual concerned, but the owner of
the property and perhaps, the welfare of the family to which the juvenile
belongs. The same type of discretion is able to be exercised throughout many
of the functions and duties of all constables of police. Particularly, does this
apply in relation to the investigation of breaches of the Motor Trafﬁc Act.
Control of Discretion
Having established that a constable has a discretion to arrest, it is
necessary to consider what controls have been placed upon that discretionary
power and before doing so. it is perhaps advisable to consider the position of
the powers of the Commissioner of Police and the authority vested in him to
issue instructions to members of the Force.
The New South Wales Police Force is under the superintendence of the
Commissioner of Police. For many years the person selected for the position
came from within the service, having progressed through numerous ranks and
positions. The appointment is made by a recommendation from the
government of the day to the executive council of the State. The last five
Commissioners of Police have each had in excess of 35 years of experience in
the Force at the time of their appointment. The Police Regulation Act
provides for the removal from Ofﬁce of the Commissioner for misbehaviour
or incompetence and answerable to Parliament, through the Minister of
Police. In an address during 1978 to the annual conference of the Australian
and South Pacific Police Commissioners, the Honourable N.K. Wran, Q.C.,
M.P., the Premier of New South Wales, said:-
All the States of Australia have. inherited a common form of
government based on the Westminster or English system. The essence of
that system is responsible government. In this context the word
responsible has a very special meaning. It means that the members of the
Government, the Ministers, must be elected Members of Parliament
and are responsible to Parliament and answerable to Parliament for
their actions. All of our institutions and democratic traditions are built
around this central feature of ministerial answerability to Parliament.
That is what responsible government is all about. Ministers must answer
to Parliament for the actions of their departments. That is the only way
parliamentary government can work; it is the only way responsible
government can work.
it follows that if Ministers must answer to Parliament for their
departments, then departments must be fully answerable to Ministers.
That principle has been ﬁrmly established in our system not only to
protect democracy but to protect public servants themselves. It is not the
public servants but the Ministers who must answer to Parliament and
ultimately to the people. It is always the Minister’s head that is on the
chopping block. There can be no exception to that rule if we are to have
a true parliamentary democracy.
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The question of the authority of the Commissioner to control actions
. commenced by members of the police force in Petty Sessions and Children‘s
Courts, has long been a matter of conjecture but, because only very rarely do
instances arise where the Commissioner’s authority is questioned, the matter
has not been canvassed at length in New South Wales. The statutory powers
are not as clear as they might be.
Police Regulation Act
This Act gives power for the making of Rules, which are treated in the
same manner as the Regulations in that they lay on the table of Parliament for
14 days and if no objection is taken they become law. Unless, of course, the
Rules are subsequently ruled ultra vires the Act. In the current situation the
relevant Rule is Rule 7, Clause (0 provides that the Commissioner may issue
such Instructions for the government or direction ofthe Force as he considers
the circumstances require.
Case Law
" No court ruling on this aspect is known. However, the decision of the
Supreme Court of New South Wales in Reg -v— Ragen reportedin8l Weekly
Notes is regarded as the accepted view on the point wherein McClemens J
speaking of the Judge‘s Rules said at page 577:—
By virtue of the Rules, to which I have referred, the Commissioner has
laid down a code for the Instruction of Police in the conduct of
interrogation. These Instructions, though more detailed, adopt in
substance the English Judge’s Rules but their authority in New South
Wales is not because they are the English Judge‘s Rules but because the
Commissioner has exercised a power given to him by law.
Common Law
This may be phrased the “law of precedent". It is clear that authority
envisaged in certain ofthe Police Instructions, which will be referred to later,
have been exercised for over ﬁfty years. Thus, it could reasonably be argued
that precedent is established. It might also be noted that no court has objected
to or upheld objection taken in this regard.
Accordingly, it is suggested that in framing the Police Instructions the
Commissioner has exercised a power lawfully given to him. Returning to the
question of discretion given, to a constable under the Crimes Act and the
Common Law, the Commissioner has issued various Instructions to act as a
safety check to the exercise of the Constable's discretion.
In exercising his discretion to arrest, the constable has to consider the‘
affect on the offender, even mere arrest may destroy reputation, or cause loss
of a job, or visit grave injury upon his family. Whilst a policeman from his
early days is trained in applying the law and receives continuing instructions,
his actions are controlled by Police Instructions, oversighted and directed by
supervisory officers, and are subject and answerable to the public through the
courts.
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There is no other member of the community whose actions are under
such close scrutiny; he is conscious that complaints made about him are
thoroughly investigated by the Internal Affairs Branch of the force under the
ever watchful eye of the ombudsman and the media.
Much .has been said by lawyers and police alike about police discretion
but little has been heard from the public. it is the public opinion that is
paramount. The public looks to the policeman as the guardian of their safety
and enforcer of laws but they expect him to be more than an instrument for , '
law and order. He is expected to be fair and honest in his application of the law
and by exercising the discretion vested in him, is placed in a position to achieve
that aim. How that discretion is exercised and the control placed upon that
' discretion is the important factor.
The Commissioner of Police has issued specific instructions respecting
the arrest of citizens. The arrest should be affected in as quiet a manner as
possible without the use of no more force or violence than is absolutely
required. Care should be taken to ensure that the prisoner is properly handled
and only such restraint is placed upon him as may be absolutely neccesary for
his safe custody. He should be taken to a police station upon arrest and the
charge against him entered in the charge book. He should be brought before a
justice without unreasonable delay to be dealt with according to law.
Like instructions are issued to responsible supervising officers to ensure
the discretion is properly carried out in that the officer in charge of any station
as distinct from the “station officer" oversights the work of his subordinates.
This ensures police work within the accepted guidelines and exercise
discretion in the proper manner. All police receive “on the job training"
lectures each fortnight for the purpose of keeping them informed and up to
date with all matters they may encounter. This naturally assists them in the
decisions they are obliged to make. .
Trained personnel performing prosecuting duties in all Courts of Petty
Sessions, Coroner’s Courts and Children‘s Courts throughout the State,
where police cases are listed are able to assist members of the Force with
advice and guidance in respect of the following matters:-
a. The correctness of the charge.
b. Interpretation of law and court procedure.
c. Obtaining of evidence during investigation.
d. The preparation of evidence obtained for presentation to the court.
6. Any othertmatter associated with court proceedings.
The role of the Police Prosecutor in other Australian States and
England has been criticised. It is not part of this paper to examine that
criticism except to say the New South Wales Police Prosecuting Branch is
unique in the world and cannot be compared with other systems.
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A discretion is given under Police Instructions fora Police Prosecutor,
after examination of available evidence. if he feels the facts do not substantiate
that charge but disclose another offence. to arrange for the correct charge to
be preferred and the original charge withdrawn at an appropriate stage ofthe
proceedings. Additionally, where more than one charge arising out of the
same circumstances has been preferred against an offender, for example,
“Driving under the Influence of lntoxicating Liquor" and “Negligent
Driving”, or where the charges concern the same property, for example,
“Break, Enter and Steal" and “Goods in Custody". and the major charges
found proven, the minor charge or charges may be withdrawn. This action is
not undertaken until ‘after the determination of any appeal or other
proceedings in respect to the major charge.
Usually, the court before whom such procedure takes place requires the
Prosecutorto set out his reasons prior to granting permission for withdrawal
although the court has no legal right to ask.5 Where any doubt exists as to the
desirability of proceeding with or withdrawing a charge. a direction is sought
from the Commissioner. There may be various ' reasons for a Police
Prosecutor to seek withdrawal. In the case of a person charged with only a
minor offence being certified mentally ill before the charge is dealt with,
application is made to the court for permission to withdraw on the grounds
that in the circumstances, it is desired not to offer any evidence. The exercise
of such discretion in these particular types of cases is perfectly justified and
certainly in the public interest. It is my experience that the exercise of this
discretion is closely watched by the courts. ~
Free legal aid is readily available to people unable to afford legal
representation. It is unusual for defendants to appear unrepresented,
particularly, following an arrest. Accordingly, the use of the discretion of the
Prosecutor is under the protective surveillance of the legal representative of
the defendant in addition to the Court.
Representations
Numerous requests are made by or on behalfof persons charged with an
offence or crime to withdraw such matter for a wide variety of reasons. These
requests are. in fact, made to:-
a. The police involved.
b. Their officers.
c. Some senior members of the Force.
d. The Commissioner.
e. A member of parliament.
 
5. Australian Law Journal. Vol. [0 p. 442 at 443
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Procedure
Any such request must be forwarded to the Commissioner of Police who
calls for the papers and informationIn respect of the particular matter The
Commissioner may then seek the advice of any member of the Service he
considers may be of assistance. The papers are then forwarded to the
superintendent in charge of the Police Prosecuting Branch for his comment
and recommendation and ﬁnally, the Commissioner, after a careful analysis
of all the information, makes the decision as to whether or not such matter
should continue as a prosecution.
Decision — Considerations
In considering whether a prosecution should continue and realising that
each case must be looked at on its own merits,as a guide, the following matters
may be considered: -
1. Public policy;
2. The reason or the reasons advanced as to why a charge should not
proceed;
3. The health of the defendant (if relevant);
4. The nature of the lcharge; V
5. Does the exercise of discretion raise an inference of corruption
(negated by open documented reasons).
6. The effect proceedings may have on a complainant;
7. The attitude of the complainant;
'8. The weight of evidence available and the likelihood of Obtaining a
prima facie case; '
9. The character of the defendant; and/or
10. Any such other matters that may be relevant in the particular case.
Safety Checks
Summary Offences
Prior to a person being charged with some offence or crime the following
safety checks exist:-.
1. The discretion of the arresting officer.
2. The discretion of the station officer (who may refuse any charge)
and record such refusal.
 3. The oversight of both by the officer in charge of the station.
4. The availability of Police Prosecutor for consultation, if necessary.
All of which are set out in Police Instructions.
.After a person has been charged additional safety checks come into
operation in that:- '
1. An experienced Prosecutor oversights the charge preferred against
the person.
2. Representations made for withdrawal of a charge must be
considered by the Commissioner.
Members of the Police Force are, in fact, members of the public who
have accepted the responsibility of their ofﬁce, receive special training, are
subject to the law, strict discipline and supervision. Each ofﬁcer is responsible
for his own actions and, of course, realises the taking of a persons liberty may
well be reviewed by the Commissioner or the court.
Indiclable Offences ,
All the safety checks that apply to summary matters apply equally to
indictable offences, however, additional safety measures exist in that a
magistrate sitting ministerially is required to hear the police case which has to
be established to a prima facie level. At this point, the defendant has the right
to silence or call evidence. The magistrate is required to determine whether a
prima facie case has been made out and, if so, whether or not to commit such
person to stand for trial.
The Attorney-General, through the Crown Prosecutors, then considers
all the material available and recommends whether or not to ﬁle a ‘.‘Bill”.
Should. no Bill be filed then the defendant or accused is notified and that
concludes the matter. Representations may be made to the Attorney-General
not to file a Bill, police are notified that no Bill is filed and like members of the
public are not informed of the reasons.
The use of discretion to arrest and proceed as outlined is always open to
charges of partiality, malice, lack of uniformity and oppression. One thing is
certain, that in the exercise of discretion one cannot please all the people all
the time. It seems safe to say. however, that the manner in which the police in
New South Wales exercise discretion in relation to charge matters pleases
most of the people most of the time.
The alternative to charging a person is to proceed by way of summons.
In the main, proceedings by summons are usually taken in respect of minor
matters such as breaches of the traffic law, licencing and matters of a like
nature. In such instances, the reporting officer submits a breach report that is
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adjudicated upon by selected Senior staff who decide whether or not there
appears in the report sufﬁcient evidence to support a prima facie case and
whether, in all of the circumstances, proceedings should be instigated. Similar
criteria as used in charge matters is used in summons cases to determine
whether proceedings should continue. The senior ofﬁcers making decisions in
this regard are sufficiently remote from the point of confrontation as to be
able to retain a degree of impartiality or objectivity. As in charge cases, if a
prosecution is shown to be brought in particular faith, there are no shortage of
agencies willing to point it out.
Cautioning offenders, particular juveniles, in lieu of prosecution has
been a police practice for many years because, particularly in the case of
juveniles, an unlawful act can vary so greatly in its gravity. It has received
approval in recent years from ministers of the crown, welfare workers and
sociologists.
ls the cautioning procedure misused by police? The question was
thoroughly examined in Police Cautions — A Study in the Exercise of
Police Discretion6 which concludes, “certainly with regard to offenders
described in the empirical study, it can be said that the practice ofca utioning is
a sensible and useful way of dealing with certain types of offenders and that
Police discretion not to prosecute is exercised wisely“. The exercise of this
discretion in New South Wales has been criticised but, it is thought that all
sections of the community generally are well satisfied with the impartial and
often sympathetic way in which matters of this kind are made by the police.
The Limits of Police Discretion
When considering the limits of police discretion within the range of
constable to Commissioner of Police one cannot ﬁnd better consolation than
that as written by DOT Williams, Fellow Emmanuel College, Cambridge, in
his article on the Police and Law Enforcement (1968), Criminal Law Review
at 35!. He stated, inter alia:- .
It was conceded by the Court of Appeal that the police have a very .wide
discretion in enforcing the law. It is up to the chief officer of police or his
subordinates to determine the manner in which the police force is to be
deployed in general, whether and how inquiries should be instituted in a
particular case, and whether and for what to prosecute in a particular
case. There are restrictions of course. In the organisation of his force the
chief ofﬁcer of police is subject to a number of direct and indirect,
statutory and informal controls. In investigations account has to be
taken of such rules as those relating to telephone-tapping and police
questioning. The discretion to prosecute is also hedged around with
various restrictions. Regulations provide for those cases which the
police must report to the Director of Public Prosecutions so that he can
decide whether or not to intervene. Then there are those offences for
which no prosecution can be brought by anyone without the consent of a
Law Officer or of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
 
6. Police Cautions ~— A Study in the Exercise of Police Discretion by DJ. Steer
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Within such bounds, however, the discretion remains considerable. This
is to be seen vividly in the fields of road traffic and public order.
Discretion as to road traffic offences is evidence in the general police
attitude to such devices as random road blocks or, so far as prosecutions
are concerned; in the large number of verbal and written warnings or
cautions which are given each year. ln the sphere of public order the
police have various discretionary devices of a preventive nature allowed
to them and there is a notoriously wide range of offences to choose from
for purposes of prosecution.
, Other offences which are or have been particularly subject to discretion
include bigamy and abortion and those involving homosexual conduct.
The attitude of the police in-such troublesome areas must frequently be
determined by a policy directive of some nature. It was found by the
Wolfenden COminittee, for instance, that in some police districts no
proceedings were to be initiated as to homosexual offences unless there
had been a complaint or the offence had-“otherwise obtruded itself upon
the notice of the police, for instance by a breach of public order and
decency". In another difﬁcult area of law and morality, a Home Office
circular of I921 drew the attention of all police forces “to the practice of
the Metropolitan Police in prosecuting for attempted suicide only where
there was some definite circumstance calling for punishment or the
order of the court constituted the only chance of refuge and asylum for
one too weak to stand alone“. ’
Are policy decisions of such a kind to be disapproved of by the courts? It
would seem not. Lord Denning apparently had no objection to the
attitude adopted towards attempted suicide up to I96], and Salmon L.J.
saw nothing wrong in the policy decision “not to prosecute, save in
exceptional circumstances, young teenage boys who have had sexual
intercourse with girls just under the age of sixteen". Indeed, the fact that
such policy decisions have normally been accepted as part and parcel of
police discretion must have encouraged the argument that there could
be no challenge in the courts.
:ln conclusion, I would point out that recourse to the rule of law in an
effort to eliminate or reduce discretion is a natural reaction to the abuse of
discretion; but it is, nevertheless, a naive reaction. We must accept that there
will be questions asked concerning the overall police conduct in the use of that
discretion but, it is clearly a right and indeed a duty to exercise a proper
discretion, based upon sound judgment and experience. -ln very many
instances the result of thatjudgment is closely scrutinized by our courts at all
levels and happily, I am unable to find any severe criticism by the courts
concerning the many areas involving that special sphere of police 'duty
involving such discretion.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Inspector C. L. Naylor
The question of discretion given to the police in prosecuting persons for
offences has been an issue that has been discussed over a number of years. I
certainly agree with Mr. Davidson that it constitutes a factor of very great
importance in the administration of the criminal law and I agree, as do a
number of learned authors, that police do have a discretion to prosecute or
refrain from prosecuting. At the outset 1 suggest that this seminar not accept
that discretion should be replaced by a policy of full enforcement of the law.
Accepting that discretion does exist and should remain with the police
officer as it does today, I want to emphasise that I believe the discretion should
be exercised intelligently and fairly, not lightly or capriciously. There are
several advantages in leaving discretion with the police officer, there are ample
safeguards in the exercise of that discretion, and police are accountable forth.
exercise of discretion.
In 1965 Glanville Williams in the Criminal Law Review wrote a great
deal about police discretion. He recognised that several authorities had
criticised the use of discretion by police, but he went on to say that the real
criticism was that discretion was being used but that it was not being used
enough. It is my contention that in this rapidly changing society of ours that
the discretion to prosecute or not to prosecute is more relevant and calls upon
the police to exercise that discretion more frequently. I believe that the public
look upon the police ofﬁcer as the guardian of the law. ldo not believe that the
public want a police ofﬁcer to go around arresting everybody when they
commit an offence. I believe that they want him to enforce the laws fairly and
justly and expect him to be tolerant in his application of the law, depriving him
of his discretion or restricting that discretion will not assist in achieving that
objective.
What are the safety checks on a police ofﬁcer when he decides not to
prosecute? Mr. Davidson quoted the Police Regulation Act and it is there, of
course, the rules to the Act. Every police officer is aware that disciplinary
action will most certainly be taken against him if he fails to comply with the
terms of his ofﬁce. He is a member of a disciplinary body and the discipline to
which he is subject does work. He is subject to the directions of his senior
officers, and disobedience of that command is subject to penalty. The
Commissioner of Police has issued specific instructions and a refusal to carry
out those instructions would result in penalty. 1n the paper prepared by Mr.
Nesbitt a number of these instructions have been set out (page 41). M r. Nyman
said that it was apparent that those instructions were bona ﬁde, they were
,good, well founded instructions.
Another safeguard relating to non action by police officers is the media.
I know some of the criticisms by the media are unfounded and sensationalised.
but nevertheless this type of criticism does exercise a constable‘s mind if he
contemplates a refusal to act. Complaints of non action by police can very
easily be made to members of Parliament, to public ofﬁcials. to the
Commissioner himself and to the Ombudsman, and such complaints I can
assure you are subject to very wide and searching investigation by the Police
Internal Affairs Branch.
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Mr. Nyman set out a number of other reasons why it was proper for
police to use their discretion not to arrest and enumerated some of the
safeguards. in particular he referred to the Coroners Courts. I do not intend to
enlarge on that except to say that that is the real situation. He gave a number
of examples when he referred to the Highway Patrol and other matters, but I
could give you another example. The community in the I970’s and the 1980‘s
is very conscious of its right of assembly and protest. lt is not uncommon at
demonstrations, or at assemblages of people, that some persons, because of
the heat of the moment and the nature of the protest, commit offences which
normally they would not contemplate. Assuming that a police officer under
those circumstances was bound to arrest what should have been a peaceful but
somewhat demonstrative protest could well turn into a riot situation. Police
fortunately rarely are accused of overreacting. Depriving police of discretion
not to prosecute could justify such a criticism.
Failure to act does not mean that a person is deprived of rehabilitation
advantages to which convicted persons might be entitled. Drug Rehabilitation
Centres, Youth and Community Services, Mental Health Institutions are not
restricted because of the failure to arrest. To arrest a person and take him
before a court for a trivial offence or an offence where some possible doubt
exists, may result in unwarranted drastic consequences, not only for himself
individually, but for his employment and his family.
I feel that the main thrust of the debate at this seminar is the non-action
taken by police officers and the restraints placed upon that discretion and the
accountability for non-action. I think it is also necessary to consider the safety
checks placed on a police officer when he does decide to arrest, for from that
flows the discretion which the Commissioner properly exercises in not
proceeding with matters.
In Mr. Nesbitt's paper he gave in detail a police instruction on how to
arrest a person (page 41). First of all after arrest the police officer is required to
take the accused person to a poliCe station and there the station sergeant is
required to enquire into the matter to see whether it is a correct charge, to see
whether the facts supplied to him do in fact constitute an offence. It may be
necessary also to satisfy his officer. In the New South Wales police force there
are 9000 non-commissioned police officers and 300 commissioned ofﬁcers.
Such is the discipline in the police force that the officer‘s word is a command
that cannot be ignored. It is a very stringent discipline. Assume the charge is
laid, it is then vetted at the court by a police prosecutor. This ensures that the
facts are properly placed before the court and in fact does create an offence.
Another discretion then comes into operation. Mr. Nesbitt sets out a police
instruction in his paper in relation to mentally ill people (page 42). If the
charge is inappropriate then the police prosecutor has the authority in
accordance with police instructions to withdraw that charge and substitute the
correct charge. The safeguard for the matter is that usually the court want to
know the reasons why this is so. Withdrawal of charges completely, except in
very limited circumstances, as Mr. Nesbitt has outlined and where I have
outlined is solely within the ambit of the Commissioner. He personally
peruses representations and recommendations. Usually the final
recommendation comes from the senior police prosecutor. He is currently a
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senior superintendent. The recommendation and the Commissioner‘s
approval or rejection to withdraw a charge is very much remote from the
arresting ofﬁcer.
When exercising his discretion to arrest, a constable knows that he is
personally responsible for his own actions and liable to damages if he has
acted maliciously. HeIs also fully aware that he18 open to criticism from the
court, and the manner in which he acts is open to scrutiny and investigation by
the Internal Affairs Branch on complaint to the Ombudsman.
Representations frequently and often flow to the Commissioner of
Police for withdrawal of charges. These representations in the main flow from
Members of Parliament, members of the legal profession, and the actual
offender. Such requests, like the other withdrawal proceedings before the
court, are referred to the Commissioner and he again considers those
personally. Such matters of the nature of the charge, the health of the
defendant, whether the exercise of the discretion raises an inference of
corruption, the effect of the proceedings on the complainant, the weight of
evidence, the likelihood of obtaining a prima facie case, the character of the
defendant and many other matters which may be relevant are censidered by
him. He is answerable to the Minister and the Minister is answerable to
Parliament.
The safeguards, I suggest, are there. It is my suggestion to you that the
question of police discretion in New South Wales is not really a problem at all.
The issue, I believe, is only of partial importance because of the safety checks
that l have enumerated flow from' police instructions. Finally on the
establishment ofsome supervisory body such as suggested in the United States
by Professor Goldstein where police authorities are seetionalized is very
different from the centralised system adopted in New South Wales. I believe
that the formation of such a supervisory body in New South Wales is
unnecessary, unweildy and would lead to lengthy delaysin the prosecuting
process.
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COMMENTARY
G.D. Woods
Director. Criminal Law Review Division
My comments upon Mr. Nesbitt's paper can be concisely stated as
follows:- ‘
l. I agree that under the present law police do have a considerable
discretion as to whether or not to arrest or prosecute. Like Mr. Nesbitt, I
disagree with the view that any advantage would be gained by the introduction
in New South Wales of the principle of mandatory initiation of the criminal
process as occurs for example in Italy. The system would grind to a halt under
such a rule. '
2. I agree with the first part of the proposition which follows:
The use ofdiscretion to arrest and proceed as outlined is always open to
charges of partiality, malice, lack of uniformity and oppression. One
thing is certain, that in the exercise ofdiscretion one cannot please all the
people all the time. It seems safe to say, however, that the manner in
which the police in New South Wales exercise discretion in relation to
charge matters pleases most of the people most of the time. (page 44).
It seems to me that the last sentence of the quotation is unprovable. lfa
discretion is exercised privately we can never know whether to be pleased or
displeased about it.
3. I disagree with Mr. Nesbitt‘s comment that:
There is no other member of the community whose actions are under
such close scrutiny; he is conscious that complaints made about him are
thoroughly investigated by the Internal Affairs Branch of the force
under the ever watchful eye ofthe ombudsman and the media. (page 41).
It seems to me incorrect to suggest that no other members of the
community are subject to as strong scrutiny in the performance oftheir duties _
as are police. Furthermore, I believe that the “eye ofthe Ombudsman” is not
“ever watchful". M r. Smithers is neither omniscient nor plenipotent. So far as
the vigilance of the media is concerned, it is erratic and directed
predominantly towards sensation.
lndced. much police discretion is exercised beyond the scrutiny ofindependent authorities. -
4. It is true that:
The Commissioner of Police has issued speciﬁc instructions respectingthe arrest of citizens. The arrest should be affected in as quiet a manneras possuble With the use of no more force or violence than is absolutely
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required. Care should be taken to ensure that the prisoner is properly
handled and only such restraint is placed upon him as may be absolutely
necessary for his safe custody. He should be taken to a police station
upon arrest and the charge against him entered in the charge book. He
should be brought before a justice without unreasonable delay to be
dealt with according to law. (page 41).
However, these instructions are not, in their detail, a matter of public
record. So far as I am aware, only a relatively few ofall ofthe Commissioners
Instructions touching upon the whole subject of discretion are made public. I
appreciate that the police do not want to publicise aspects of their procedures
which might jeopardize the security of ofﬁcers or limit the force‘s efﬁciency.
And I am certain that indeed the Commissioner does issue instructions
governing discretion.
In an open society, such instructions ought to be available for public
scrutiny. It then might be possible to say accurately that“ . .the manner in
which the police in New South Wales exercise discretion in relation to charge
matters please most of the people most of the time".
5. An instance of discretion in relation to a juvenile offender given by
Mr. Nesbitt is a good example of the proper and legitimate use of discretion
(page 38). The matters he lists under the heading “Decision —
Considerations” also seem to me relevant and important, albeit inevitably
uncertain in some instances (page 43). The question of corruption is highly
significant and is probably the most important consideration people have in
mind when they express concern about police discretion.
6. There are certainly corrupt New South Wales police officers, just as
there are corrupt solicitors and barristers. This corruption is a direct
reﬂection, in my view, of corruption in the wider business community ﬂowing
from an excessive concern with material values and an inadequate concern in
the social and political structure with the values of social co-operation and
communal responsibility. .
These broader problems cannot be solved by any steps which might be
taken in relation to the narrow subject of “police discretion”. They must be
addressed through broader political action.
However, the clear and public articulation of the manner in which police
discretion should be exercised would in my view, go some way towards
removing possible grounds for criticism or suspicion. l advert again to the
Police Commissioner’s instructions and invite him to consider whether more
of the details therein could reasonably be made public.
7. Finally I should say that I am aware of Mr. Nesbitt‘s death shortly
after he had completed this paper. In the circumstances, it is a difﬁcult task to
comment in any way critically upon what he had written. Nonetheless I knew
him as a man perfectly capable ofexpressing himselfclearly and ofcngaging in
frank interchange. He was a man whom I respected and I am certain that he
would not have taken amiss anything which 'I have said above. Certainly the
paper is clearly written and it canvasses very bluntly the relevant issues.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
0.1). Woods
As many of you will know Mr. Nesbitt who wrote the paper upon which
I have commented died after writing it and before this seminar. l should say
ﬁrstly that he was a man whom I knew and respected and l pay my further
respects to him before making any further comment. I am sure that you will
appreciate that in the circumstances it is rather a difﬁcult task to make
cOmment.
Mr. Naylor referred to the example of a demonstration,. Some of you
will recall that in 1970 in South Australia a famous episode occurred where the
then Premier, Mr. Dunstan, was confronted with a situation where a number
of anti-Vietnam demonstrators had proposed to sit down in the main street of
Adelaide, at the corner of Hindley Street, and the Commissioner of Police
made known his intention to go ahead and arrest any people who did so. The
Premier, Mr. Dunstan, took the view that there was a discretion vested in the
Police Commissioner, that there ought not in the circumstances be arrests,
that the traffic should be re-routed and the demonstration (being on a matter
of public importance) should be allowed to proceed. In the event, the
Commissioner took the view that he was independent ofthe Minister and he
instructed his men to arrest the demonstrators. They did so and there was
great confusion. The report of the subsequent Royal Commission, headed by
Mr. Justice Bright, made the point that although the police swear an oath of
allegiance to Her Majesty and an oath to uphold the laws, nonetheless there is
a discretion vested in them which sensibly permits them to overlook certain
behaviour the immediate prosecution of which would result in even greater
tumult or disorder than that which was actually occurring.
That undoubtedly is the law in New South Wales at the present time.
Whether the discretion be vested in the police ofﬁcer by Statute or by
Common Law does not really matter.
There is such a discretion.
Mr. Naylor indicated that the police frequently receive letters and
application in other forms seeking the exercise ofa discretion not to prosecute
persons who have committed offences. He said (1 am not sure whether he
intended to say it) that the Commissioner considers each ofthese applications
himself, personally. Now I am not certain whether that was what he meant to
say, or whether he meant to say that the Commissioner did so through his
Senior Prosecuting officers, but in any event it would seem to me to be rather
surprising if the Commissioner were to be able to consider each of those
matters individually. Perhaps we can be enlightened about that later on. But
in any event I ﬁnd myselfin agreement with Mr. Davidson when he says that it
would be desirable if the guidelines which the Commissioner exercises in
acceding to such application were to be the product of somejoint thinking by
the kinds of people Mr. Davidson refers to — for example, a committee ofthe
judges. the magistrates, the police, of course, and the legal profession
generally.
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In making decisions about the question of prosecution the passage of
time and the course of experience dictate that certain cases will be decided in a
like way — at least one hopes so. I have indicated in my paper my awareness
that there are some of the Commissioner‘s instructions clearly which for
reasons of safety (the police officer’s safety in certain situations) ought not to
be made public. I think that is reasonable, but there are very many of the
instructions (and particularly those one assumes are in existence relating to
prosecution) Which I think ought to be made public. These matters ought not
to be decided without the public being aware of the guidelines which are
utilised. l have said in my written comments that in an open society such
Instructions ought to be available for public scrutiny.
Why do we worry so much about discretion? One reason for it is that we
all pay at least lip service to the proposition that the law should apply equally
to all persons subject to it. That is, “Equality before the law" is a principle
which we think is desirable, and if it be the case that a discretion is exercised
differently in likes cases then that in principle is a bad thing. But the criminal
justice system is inevitably imperfect.
One type of unfairness which does occur, no doubt, from time to time, is
the exercise of discretion, wrongly, for corrupt motives, not to prosecute.
Undoubtedly there are corrupt policeman in New South Wales, just as there
are corrupt solicitors and, I am ashamed to say, corrupt barristers. The degree
of corruption which exists in a certain society at a given point in time is a
measure not of the amount of discretion which is available in the criminal
process but of other factors unrelated to it. I am certain as Mr. Naylor says
that there is indeed a strong disciplinary element in the New South Wales
Police force and to the extent that it is a strong disciplinary element it is a good
thing. It may be that there ought to be a stronger disciplinary element amongst
both branches of the legal procession. That is a matter which is currently a
matter of consideration by the Law Reform Commission. But police should
not regard it as any attack on them for people to say publicly that clearly from
time to time cases do occur of the malicious and wrong exercise of discretion
not to prosecute in return for reward that is corruptly. My argument would be
that it is not a question of police discretion which is primarily at issue here. It is
the general level of corruption in society of which any evil-doing on the part of
police is merely a reﬂection. It is also a direct reflection of maladjustments
within the criminal justice system itself and particularly relating to the actual
scope of the criminal law.
In 1972 Paul Ward and I wrote a book called Law and Order in
Australia, and we advocated at that stage that the so called “British" system
for dealing with heroin addiction should be adopted in Australia, and that one
of the advantages ﬂowing from that in England (and no doubt in Australia
also were it to be accepted) would be that the funds generated which might be
utilised for the purpose of tempting police officers and others involved in the
criminal justice system wrongfully to exercise their discretion not to prosecute
or not to convict or not to proceed with a prosecution would be limited. Some
of you may have seen an article in The National Times several weeks ago
called “The Heroin Problem" in which the author raised this question. It is a
matter about which I have had a strong opinion for some time. I speak on this
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matter not as a person representing the government. I am an independent
statutory officer and l have a function of advising in relation to criminal law
reform. I do not see any need to temper my opinions on this question because
the present attitude of the government may be contrary to the views that I put
forward, but I seriously suggest that we have now reached the position in this
State (and, indeed, in this country) where the level of profits ﬂowing from
that fact that heroin is unlawful is a seriously corruptive factor in the police
and in the legal profession. This is a separate matter, quite a separate matter,
from the question whether or not making it legal will reduce the use of heroin.
Now I am the father of two children, both soon to become teenagers, and
I am just,as worried about the drug problem as anybody else. I think that it
would be desirable if there were less heroin being sold in suburban hotels and
outside schools and so on and I think that the way that this could be achieved
would be by making the possession or use of heroin legal if given by a doctor,
as the British do it, and attack the people who sell it unlawfully. By making its
use legal, it would take away the impetus for the pushing up of the price. It is
the pushing up of the price of it which causes addicts to attempt to persuade all
their mates to use it so they can get an income to buy their own.
I diverge on this point. merely because I think that any suggestion of the
misuse of discretion by police for corrupt motives relates to other issues than
police discretion itself. I think it is undeniable that there must be police
discretion. It should be controlled. It should be made more public. CorrUption, ,
is not a question of simply there being a certain number of wicked policemen,
just as it is not a question of there being a certain number of wicked solicitors
.or wicked barristers. The fact is that in any society, if the temptations are so
systematic and so gross as they are currently in New South Wales and in
Australia with regard to illegal drug proﬁts, inevitably discretion will be
exercised corruptly and I do not suggest that we can solve the problem by
getting rid of police discretion. We cannot — we have to look to other
problems.
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DISCUSSION PAPER
THE DENIAL OF DISCRETION IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS:
A RETROGRESSIVE STEP?
Dr. G.L. Certoma
Lecturer in Law
The University of Sydney
The Principle of Mandatory Initiation of the Criminal Process
In some jurisdictions, and I will. restrict my comments to Italy as
exemplary of such jurisdictions, the criminal process is characterised by a
total absence of discretion with respect to its initiation; it is said that the
criminal process is obligatory. In other words, the organs of public
prosecution are bound to put the criminal process in motion in every instance
in which a breach of the criminal law comes to their notice: A.ll2
Constitution (Italy), A.74 Code ofCriminal Procedure(ltaly). Asa corollary,
the criminal process, once put in motion, cannot be suspended, interrupted or
brought an end except as expressly provided for by law: A.75 Code of
Criminal Procedure (Italy). Therefore, once the criminal process is put in
motion, it must necessarily conclude with a judgment.
The Justification for Mandatory Initiation of the Criminal Precess
The Theoretical justification. The justiﬁcation, at least in Italy, for
exclusion of all discretion is said to be the afﬁrmation of the principle of
legality, that is to say, each and every person must be subject to the
consequences, as defined by the criminal law, for his conduct. This principle is
a manifestation of the fundamental guarantee, “equality before the law".
The suppression of discretion in the criminal process denies the
possibility of conceding immunity from the criminal law to given sections of
the community and renders more effective the application of the criminal law.
Pragmatic considerations. Apart from the theoretical justiﬁcation, the
particular socio—political conditions prevalent in a given legaljurisdiction may
be such that the presence of the principle of mandatory prosecution effectively
ensures the fundamental rights of its citizens.
In Italy the principle of mandatory prosecution was a direct
consequence of a particular socio-political condition: it was the reaction to a
history of a prosecution which was tied:to the executive and thus susceptible to
political pressures. And the continued validity of such principle, apart from
the fact that it is entrenched in the Constitution. is as a result of the socio-
political-institutional structure of the Italian legal system.
Must the Criminal Process be put in motion in every case?
The principle of mandatory initiation of the criminal process does not
mean that the prosecution must initiate the criminal process against every
 
56
suspect indicated from a given set of circumstances. Just as in a system where
the principle under discussion does not exist, a prosecution is initiated only
against that suspect towards whom the evidence points. lfthe evidence is such
that there is no primafacie case against any of the suspects the consequence is
that the prosecution must seek from a judicial authority an order for
archivation of the matter as a whole. The intervention of the judicial
authority, therefore. merely acts as a check against a decision not to proceed
where the evidence is such that prima facie case exists.
Theory v. Practice
Notwithstanding the theoretical situation, there is in practice, even in
those jurisdictions where the principle of mandatory prosecution prevails, the
exercise of discretion. Fundamentally, this can be attributed to two not
unimportant factors.
. First, the excessive work load. Because of a simple reality, the large
number of complaints received. the investigative authorities are unable to
efficiently investigate each and every complaint received. There is. therforc.
inherent in this reality a selection process, a policy to act upon certain types of
criminality only and to abandon the remainder. The problem of efficiency
necessarily introduces discretion. whatever the theoretical position may be.
Second, the politics of‘crimi-nal investigation. It may often be efficient or
expedient. given certain conditions, to pursue and enforce with extra vigour
given types of criminality. However, whether such need is felt is often left for
the decision of individual commissioners. Therefore, different commissioners
will interpret current conditions, or consider the crimes deserving of vigorous
enforcement, differently. This too introduces discretion in law enforcement.
Moreover, it is difficult ifnot impossible, and even undesirable, to police
the law enforcement authorities. It is difficult to provide a sufficient control to
ensure, for example, the recording of each and every complaint made by
telephone, to detect policies at particular stations not to report certain petty
crimes, or to prevent a law enforcement ofﬁcer“turning the other way" upon
observing, for instance, a marihuana smoker. These and many similar
practices, if they do exist at all, cannot be detected, nor controlled.
The Consequences of Mandatory Prosecution
A legal system characterised by the absence of discretion with respect to
the initiation of the criminal process, will suffer from problems of efficiency
on two levels: the application of the criminal law on the one hand, and the
conduct of criminal proceedings, on the other.
With respect to the application of the criminal law, it is clear that a
system of mandatory prosecution would increase the volume of proceedings
since all crimes. however trivial, must be prosecuted, and this is necessarily at
the cost ofa more efficient application of the criminal law. Further, it may be
that, under certain conditions. the purposes of the law and public security
would be better served by refraining from initiating a criminal process.
Moreover, volume will necessarily result in delays in criminal proceedings  
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necessitating often the choice of procedures designed to expedite matters but
at the expense of the procedural guarantees which English lawyers. often
unjustifiably, deem indispensible.
A system of mandatory prosecution also comprises the sacrifice of
efficiency with respect to the conduct of the criminal process itself. For
example. and without entering upon its merits or the extent of its practical
appliCation, the so-called institution of -“plea bargaining"'is incompatible
with a strict application of the criminal law implicit in a system of mandatory
prosecution. However, it cannot be denied‘ that from a point of view of
- efficienéy that, and many other, institutions incompatible with the principle of
mandatory prosecution may present positive advantages.
Discretion or no Discretion?
it is submitted that the whole issue revolves about a single factor, .-
namely, the answerability of the organ responsible for making the choice to
prosecute or not to prosecute. The organ in turn to which the prosecution
must answer may be either the community, as in the United States where in
some instances the prosecution is an elected ofﬁce, the Parliament or a judicial
body with power to review a failure to prosecute in a given case.
If the prosecution is effectively responsible in any one of the above ways,
then discretion is always to be favoured for it enables a maximum efficiency in
the application of the criminal law and the conduct of the criminal process. '
Only if the prosecution is not answerable for its decisions must there be
restrictions on its discretion, but, of course, at the cost of efficiency.
Conclusion
Provided that the prosecution is effectively responsible for its exercise of
discretion there ought not, in a moment of haste, be the establishment of
elaborate controls, nor the establishment of rigid rules as to the manner of
exercise of that discretion together with all their consequent problems. Legal
systems adopting a system of mandatory prosecution, that is, the elimination
of all discretion, demonstrate that such approach is not efficient and, in the -
end result, does not produce a situation substantially morejust than in those
systems where discretion exists.
 
 58
PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Dr. G. L. Certoma
I want to make a couple of points of clarification. Firstly, I certainly
hope that my paper was not taken to advocate a system of mandatory
’ prosecution, along the lines ofthe Italian or the West German system, for New
South Wales. I think that the paper concludes that that is not suitable for our
State.
In all the systems where mandatory prosecution exists, it exists for
reasons apart from the theoret1cal just1fication of the principles of legality and
equality before the law. There are usually important pragmatic or practical
reasons why they exist such as certain historical factors and certain defects
inherent in the current socio-legal-political system. ’
However, in fairness to those systems, I wish to answer the question of
the cost to public funds raised by Mr. Nyman.
The way that those systems work is that a prosecution is initiated in the
' court system only in those situations where aprimafacie case exists. If there is
no such prima facie case then the matter comes before an examining judge
merely to seek an order ofarchivation of the matter and this constitutes the
judicial sanction not to proceed with the matter. Therefore, there would be
very short judicial proceedings comprising only a review or control
Consequently1n the event of a matter not proceeding there will not beany
protracted legal proceedings and it would not be as costly as may ﬁrst appear
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DISCUSSION PAPER
Nigel Smneman.
Acting President, Probation and Parole Officers Association of N.S.W.
POLICE DISCRETION AND DIVERSION PROGRAMMES
The Probation and Parole Officers’. Association is interested in the issue
of police discretion because of the scope it provides for diversion programmes
designed to deal more effectively with certain categories of offenders without
recourse to the costly processes of criminal justice leading toward
imprisonment. These programmes cbuld deal particularly with young
offenders, drug and alcohol problems. vagrancy, prostitution and a variety of
minor offences. I personally agree with Greg Woods comments about drug
offenders — the more punitive we become the more profits to “Mr. Big" and
the more difficult to control the problem. Aborigines also have a need for a
special diversion programme to suit their lifestyle. Community Justice
Centres are a concrete example of discretion being exercised.
The seminar papers recognise that police discretion already exists, is
necessary for ﬂexibility and is probably desirable. Similarly to the police,
other agencies such as the Probation and Parole Service could not operate
successfully without scope for discretion over whether to report minor
breaches to the courts or Parole Board. Generally, discretion is easier to
exercise when there has been no apparent victim of a revealed offence or where
the offence has been trivial.
The problems related to use of police discretion are concerned with the
impartiality of justice, clear legislation and the need to offer alternatives to
arrest. Generally the police appear to have been successful in exercising
impartiality in their discretion and areas of difficulties have been controversial
for the whole community. The new Offences in Public Places Act and the Bail
Act, both areas where police discretion has been tested to the limit, have
shown how difficult it is to translate good ideas into sound procedures which
will enable the police to operate effectively.
One problem in the USA. referred to by Mr. Davidson is that “pre-trial
dispositions” (page l2) do not guarantee that an offender will receive
assistance necessary to avoid a recurrence of the offence. In this regard New
South Wales has an advantage in that it has a state wide, standardised
Probation and Parole Service and other agencies providing assistance to
offenders. There is no reason why these agencies could not operate effectively
in diversion programmes if given reasonable funding, keeping in mind the
eventual savings against the cost of imprisonment. Changes in the Summary
Offences Act, for example, have placed a heavy burden in housing homeless
men on to the Salvation Army and others. Also, the Probation and Parole
Servicerhas a need of hostel accommodation specifically tailored for young
offenders at risk to criminal offences.
Police discretion in the criminal process can be used as a valuable tool in
the effective treatment or handling of a variety of minor offenders. 'l‘his
Association agrees with Mr. Davidson‘s concluding proposal that
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consideration be given to the police to require persons who are not prosecuted
to seek and accept assistance from agencies, such as the Probation and Parole
Service. One method would be to give the offender an option, similar to that in
a parking offence, of discharging the matter by referral to a designated agency
or by further attendance at court, thus guaranteeing access to the justice
system.
In the United States most diversion programmes, as I understand it.
have come from local institutions. I would like toask Mr. Davidson if
diversion programmes can be started in New South Wales without
appropriate'legislation? ls'there similar scope for local initiatives, or are we
hampered because of our centralised form of government? '
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DISCUSSION
K. J. Ryan, Barrister-at-Law
I would like to broaden the consideration of the word discretion, if I
might, by touching on two aspects ofwhat I could call “procedural discretion“
within the police discretion to institute prosecutions. These are the decision as
to whether to proceed or initiate prosecution by way of arrest or by summons,
and the decision regarding the taking ofﬁngerprints and photographs prior to
the matter being dealt with in the court.
In relation to the first, the Commonwealth Crimes Act touches on this to
some extent by exhorting policeas far as possible to proceed by way of
summons, i.e. to initiate the prosecution by way of summons, but there does
not appear to be anything written or implied in the State Law as to how police
should initiate a prosecution. There are‘some roughly accepted guidelines.
One would be dealing with people on PCS and DUl charges. I think it is quite
obvious there in their own interests, if not the interests of society, that the
prosecution should be initiated by way of arrest in most' cases. I think,
however, that there are a lot on anomalies where obviously petty matters are
dealt with by way of arrest, whereas much more serious matters are dealt with,
by way of summons, and lam wondering if some consideration could ge given
to the laying down of fairly ﬁrm guidelines by which police could be guidedin
the exercise of their discretion by reference to the nature of the offence
qualiﬁed by the circumstances of the offence and the offender.
The other matter is the taking of fingerprints and photographs. I know
that the police will say that they need fingerprints and photographs in the
identification process, but I feel there could be some guidelines laid down, e. g.
that these ﬁngerprints and photographs be not taken unless the person is
convicted or unless there is some fairly compelling reason or, at least, on
reasonable grounds it is thought that the police need the photographs or the
fingerprints for the purposes of identification.
Inspector C. 1.. Naylor
In reference to the matter raised by Mr Woods, as to whether the
Commissioner personally goes through all withdrawal files. All withdrawals
come through the ofﬁce of the Senior Police Prosecutor. They vary on a
weekly basis, but there would be probably two or three per week and the
Commissioner would only look at those where it was recommended that
withdrawal take place. Where a recommendation is that the matter be left to
the Court, it is for the court to decide not the Commissioner. There are not
very many for him to look at. Of course, if he is absent it goes to the Assistant
Commissioner acting in his stead. All files are précised to present the
Commissioner with the salient points, and if he agrees with them he may or
may not consent to the matter being withdrawn.
In reply to Mr. Ryan, there are guidelines for the issue of summonses
that are clearly set out in police instructions. There is a vast number of
summons matters taken out against offenders depending on the
circumstances, e.g. for driving with prescribed concentration ofalcohol when
%
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the accused is in hospital, a number of offences under the National Parks and
Wildlife Act, many offences under the Firearms Act, the Dog Act. and. of
course, the Motor Traffic Act in particular.
In regard to ﬁngerprints after conviction, he would have to be held in
custody in order that his ﬁngerprints be properly searched and his record be
placed before the court, which would require some amendment to the Crimes
Act. Such records are, of course, confidential. I cannot see the advantage in
doing that.
M. L. Rutherford, Barrister-at-Law
I would like to comment on an aspect of the paper of Mr. Davidson.
What causes me some concern can best be described as the “Denning
dilemma“. I refer to Raymond Denning and not Lord Denning. On this issue
of the Commissioner’s discretion apparently it has been made quite clear to
him that his offence of escaping from Grafton Gaol is going to be the subject
of the Commissioner‘s discretion to arrest and have him charged. However, in
that gaol there are a number ofofficers who, by their own admission and from
a finding of the Chief Judge at CommOn Law, have themselves engaged in far
more serious conduct over an extended period of time, and I will suffice by
reading what His Honour said in one paragraph about it.
“It is the view of the Commission that every prison officer who served at
Grafton at the time it was used as a gaol for intractables must have
known of its brutal regime. The majority of them, if not all, would have
taken part in the illegal assaults on prisoners. In the time available the
Commission has not attempted to discover or assess the culpability of
individual ofﬁcers”
and earlier he refers to words such as “horror " and “brutality".
Now to my knowledge, not one of those officers has ever been asked SCI
much as a single question by a police officer. There has been no attempt to
bring them before a magistrate even though prisoner after prisoner gave
sworn evidence in great detail, subject to cross-examination by senior counsel
and counsel, who are now themselves judges without being shaken in the
opinion 'of the Chief Judge at Common Law. None of the officers against
whom the allegations was made chose to rebut them, and made a collective
general admission. It seems to me to be quite wrong that that type of ﬂagrant
criminality can be ignored. It was ignored in many other gaols. ln Bathurst in
1970 the prison officers made again collective admission that most ofthem led
by the Superintendent had for three days systematically bashed all prisoners
there, whether they be guilty of any misdemeanour or not.
I notice that Mr. Blackburn, a member of Parliament, had the same
problem when he tried to mandamus the Commissioner of Police about
gambling.
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I agree with the speakers that police must have a discretion, but surely
when we reach a situation where the illegality is so clear, the culprits so
identifiable then something must be done to bring them before courts.
Otherwise we do have a group of people who, because of theirjob, are immune
from the law. In this “Alice in Wonderland " situation they are there to guard
people who are sentenced by judges for Similar crimes and, in many cases, for
crimes of far less gravity. I wonder that something cannot be done about it by
way of a system of mandamus on the Commissioner of Police so that it can be
heard before a judge. I do not believe that our system ofjustice and ourjudges
are so ill equipped as not to be able to understand evidence and to direct that it
be proceeded upon. If not, we all run the danger of political decisions being
made by the Commissioner of Police, in combination with his political
masters, so that certain segments of the community can engage not only in
illegality but illegality that is so public that we condemn it but are impotent.
M/3 J McGirr. Solicitor and formerly legal consultant to the N.S.W Council
for Social Services on the 1978 Green Paper on proposed child
welfare and community legislation by Mr Rex Jackson, M.P.
i would like to ask Mr. Woods to comment on the Formal Juvenile
Caution system which represents part of the discretionary process in the
juvenile criminal justice system. .You have alluded to it in point 5 of your
paper (page 51) saying that the example given by Mr. Nesbitt in his paper was
quite satisfactory to you. I presume that many people are now aware that in
addition to the ordinary discretion which is exercised by the arresting police in
adult casesz juveniles can be given what is called a Formal Caution The
arresting officer has a discretion to ﬁll out 8 JuvenileOffender Report whichis
sent in to Headquarters to be assessed. If successful a Formal Caution is
administered, otherwise the child is charged. We were assured at the New
South Wales Council of Social Services when we were looking at the proposed
Child Welfare and Community Legislation that the Report is assessed by
people qualified in the social sciences. I do not ﬁnd that sufficiently
reasurring. It is important to look at the crieria which are used in those reports
and I presume the form has not changed since that time in 1979.
This Report requests information some of which might be said to be
irrelevant, some of which1s open to charges of racism, some of which shows
class bias, parts of which might be said to be contradictory and other parts of
which might be said to be outside the ambit or the competence of an arresting
ofacer.
The first section of the Report is headed “General report of juvenile’s
antecedents”. It asks for “apparent intelligence level of the child”. (If you think
this might be difficult in normal circumstances remember this is a child in an
arrest situation.) Then there are two items which appear to me to be
contradictory: “whether the child is easily led" OR (another option) “whether
he is amenable to discipline". I suggest that it would be possible to say that the
choice might depend on whether he is being led by the police officer.
There is a category on “interests” which I would think was irrelevant.
There is another question on “nationality". I remind you that this is a form
which is used to decide whether the police will proceed to charge the child.
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The next section of the Report is headed “Particulars of the parent or
guardian". I notice that Mr. Woods has not seen fit to comment on the fact
that Mr. Nesbitt says in his paper that one of the criterion which is used to
decide whether the child will be formally charged is the welfare of thefamily.
This is one of the determinants used throughout the juvenile justice system
and it raises serious jurisprudential questions. Why should the background or
the family situation of the child be used to ascertain his guilt?
Particulars of parent or guardian include the marital status of that
parent or guardian, the parent’s or guardian’s antecedent, their character,
their employment, their home environment, the condition of their premises,
the degree of apparent parental control,' adequacy of accommodation,
structure of the family, number of children, age, sex, excetra. It is the quality
of the exercise of that discretion which has to be looked at quite carefully. I
would be interested to hear Mr. Woods comment on that, and on the work
that his Department is doing in this area generally.
G. D. Woods
l have not had the advantage of seeing the Commissioner‘s Instructions
which relate to the issue of the formal juvenile caution. When I say in my
comments on Mr. Nesbitt‘s paper than an instance of discretion in relation to
a juvenile offender given by him is a good example of the proper and
legitimate use of discretion, I am merely saying that I think that it is obvious to
anyone that in relation to juvenile offenders it clearly is proper that in many
cases there ought not to be prosecution/The list of matters which you read out
would appear to be in the nature of prying into the affairs of the family of the
offender, if he or she be that. This supports the proposition which I put
forward, to which Mr. Nyman agreed, that there ought indeed be an opening-
up on the Commissioner’s Instructions. It may well be that if they are opened
up we will see certain anomalies such as that.
With regard to the general system ofjuvenile justice, which you raise in
your question, I only today saw Mr Justice Kirby’s report on “Child Abuse in
the A.C.T.“ and from a quick glance at it I understand it is critical of the panel
approach taken in South Australia. Frankly, I could not give an answer which
bears upon new legislation in this area, as it is not something with which 1 have
been involved directly. All 1 can say is that if the factors raised by you are
taken into account there is a serious problem of privacy being invaded for the
purpose of the exercise of discretion. If a discretion can be exercised on
grounds other than those, that would be desirable.
D. Young, Probation and Parole Service
I want to question briefly the reality of imposing any formal fetters on
the discretion as exercised by police officers now. Inspector Naylor would well
record a riot situation in Newcastle in early 1979 where the rioting population
from a hotel, recently closed down, were responsible for very serious property
damage. The riot itself had the capacity to result in serious bodily harm or
death to the rioters themselves or to bystanders. It did not do so, nevertheless,
it had’that capacity. My understanding of 5.352 of the Crimes Act is that it
imposes an obligation on a police ofﬁcer in that situation" to exercise his  
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discretion then and there. In the right situation I would submit the arrest
action is taken for two purposes. Firstly, to keep the peace and secondly. to
bring the rioter before the court and in that order of priority. Nevertheless,
5.352 of the Crimes Act obliges the police officer, having made his decision to
arrest, to then proceed with the charge, and the monitoring procedures that
Inspector Naylor referred to take place thereafter. Ifany formal guidelines are
imposed on ofﬁcers in that situation they would be in the dilemma of either
acting illegally and attracting civil consequences for their action, or attracting
departmental consequences.
Be that as it may, I paid heed to Inspector Naylor’s remarks in relation to
the legal consequences of a police ofﬁcer who, in the exercise of his duty
through zeal, acted, as he put it, maliciously. My understanding of the trends
of decisions by appellate courts in this country is that misconduct by the police
officer need not quite reach the stage of being “malicious" but if it is reckless or
if it is a grossly negligent use or, rather, abuse of his authority then the
consequences are visited upon him. I would submit that the knowledge of that
is a very effective fetter on the vast majority of police officers.
I would also beg to refresh inspector Naylor‘s memory in relation to
Police Rules and Instructions dealing with the service of summonses rather
than proceeding to arrest. If my memory serves me correctly those
instructions say that a police ofﬁcer should not proceed to the extreme course
of arrest where a summons will sufﬁce to bring that person before the court.
In conclusion rather than considering formal guidelines in the way that
Dr Certoma outlined but not advocated, and formal guidelines as Mr
Davidson discussed, there may be a simpler solution to the abuse of police
discretion and that would be to open up that book of Police Rules and
instructions for everyone.
R. W. Stern, Barrister-at-Law
This seminar is concerned with the discretion of the police, but, of
course, within the community there are a number ofgovernment departments
who enforce the criminal laws and enforce the criminal sanctions which
follow. I refer to the Corporate Affairs and Consumer Affairs Department,
both of which are in the same position as the Police Department in exercising
their discretion.
The problem that I wish to pose is the problem of the Companies Act
which talks about special investigations. The special investigations provisions
of the Companies Act provide that certain interested persons can make an
application in writing for an investigation to the Attorney-General of the
State who can then exercise a discretion whether to appoint an inspector and
commence an investigation or not. Mr Davidson has already alluded to the
fact that no one really wants a Minister too closely controlling the police, and
there can be no doubt that the reason for that is that the two party system is
here to stay both1n this State andin the Federal sphere. The position in which
a defendant would find himself ultimately15 this. the Attorney-General having
exercised his discretion to commence a special investigation. He, of course,
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may table it in Parliament if he wishes and from what I have seen he usually
does. He then exercises his discretion again as to whether or not to prosecute
and, of course, he then undertakes the role of a Crown Prosecutor.(l accept
that there is a traditional role there) in ex ofﬁcio situations. But having said
that, there is then a committal proceeding where the prosecution evidence is
presented and is tested by cross-examination. If the defendant wishes he may
call evidence himself. At the end of the committal proceedings it is open to the
magistrate to commit the defendant for trial, if he so wishes, on the evidence.
Of course, it is a fundamental and a traditional legal right of the defendant to
apply for a No Bill, and a No Bill application is a perogative of the Attorney~
General who then hears from both the defendant and from the Crown. It
follows that a defendant can take cold comfort from the fact that initially the
Attorney-General has exercised his discretion twice against him — ﬁrstly to
appoint a special investigator, secondly to file charges against him at a
committal level, and now he is appealing from Caesar to Caesar to exercise his
discretion as to whether or not to file a Bill. '
. It follows, therefore, that it is in the interests of everybody, as has been
mentioned before at these seminars, that we should follow the English system
and appoint a Director of Public Prosecutions. Not only would he be aloof
from parliamentary interference or political interference but he would be seen
to be aloof from parliamentary and political interference.
G. D. Woods
The question of whether or not there should be a Director of Public
Prosecutions raises the same kind of issue that is raised by police discretion,
but the fundamental difference is that the Attorney-General is answerable in
parliament at question time, and the Director of Public Prosecutions and the
Police Commissioner are not. I have had some involvement with' Ministers in
several governments and I know that if the police are in fear of the
Ombudsman then the politicians are more in fear of question time! That is a
very real block against the misuse of discretion not to prosecute.
So far as the question of actually prosecuting is concerned, as Mr Naylor
said, if you go ahead and prosecute then it is a matter for the court. The real
question is about the misuse of discretion not to prosecute, and I see the great
argument against having a Director of Public Prosecutions precisely being
that the present system allows for clear responsibility in parliament and the
Director of Public Prosecution system does not.
Darrell Lightfool, Social Worker. Department of Youth and Community
Services
My special field of work is child abuse. As would be well known the field
is one that arouses a fair amount of emotion. I want to suggest for precisely
that reason that it becomes a field in which, as Inspector‘Naylor has said, the
legitimate discretions need to be used more and more. We fully support him in
this. It is very hard to use because of the pressures that come to bear. Those of
us who are parents and feel for their own kids in those sorts ofsituations, find
it very hard sometimes to get beyond very strongly punitive feelings that come
to the fore yery rapidly when you are faced with this kind of a situation.  
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With that introduction, I would ask Trevor Nyman to clarify a point and
Inspector Naylor give a comment from the police viewpoint.
As i understand it, the first category raised by Mr Nyman in that
particular problem area whereethe facts clearly constituted an offence was
where a distinction was drawn between a criminal wrong in the form of an
assault and a civil wrong, namely an assault in a private place. I am not sure
that the distinction lies so neatly, but if this is the case then my understanding
would be that the great majority of child abuse incidents where a child has
been assaulted would in fact occur in a private place, the home. Are you
suggesting, and raising the special category, that this is an area where police
logically exercise a discretion not to prosecute through the criminal law? The
question becomes of considerable importance to us because under existing
child welfare legislation s. 148B in one of its sub-sections gives what has been
interpreted to be an overriding discretion in the action to be taken in cases of
child abuse reported to the Director of Youth and Community Services, as
distinct from the police, and in this context at the present time discussions are
going on at senior level in relation to special police involvement in the field of
child abuse. I feel it would be of very considerable assistance to us in Youth
and Community Services if we were able to feel that, in spite of the emotion
generated by these cases, we could hope that the discretion not to prosecute
might come to the fore and be used more often where other remedies may be
available, because of the secondary damage that too often is brought about by
the application of criminal law to essentially social problems.
Trevor Nyman
What I meant was that the police make a decision in circumstances not
to prosecute since public funds would be involved by the police making a
prosecution before a police prosecutor. Examples I had in mind were the kind
of thing that take place in a private place such as backyard disputes between
two neighbours, in which the neighbour who complains to the police is
frequently advised go and see the Chamber Magistrate or his local solicitor;
and also situations where there are husband and wife disputes in which the
police decline to become involved, such as allegations of assault between
husband and wife or in some cases larceny between husband and wife. I
certainly would not include child abuse in this category, anymore than I would
include murder in the home as being in this category.
J. Parnell, S. M.. Justice Department
There are three matters I would like to raise. Firstly, our system for
juvenile welfare is not strictly a juvenile criminal justice system, and in those
circumstances many of the points made by the late Inspector Nesbitt would be
quite pertinent.
Secondly, if the prosecution is to be denied access to identification by
ﬁngerprints it will not be able to fulfill its role under the present Bail Act.
And thirdly, the question of a form of mandamus raised by Mr
Rutherford is probably already covered by the Australian Courts Act of 1824
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which provides for any citizen to move, in the Supreme Court. for a criminal
information to be laid. It is rarely invoked, but there were some instances
about 40 or 50 years ago of its use.
In general the complexity of modern society is such that it is not possible
to frame laws for every event, and discretions are inevitable. Ours is a civil
police power and the end is to uphold the law and not the regime. Mr
Davidson has pointed out the dilemma in this regard between the decisions of
the office of the Common Law constable and the Police Regulation Act. But I
think the dilemma is more apparent than real. The Commissioner himself is
also a constable, and whatever the arguments might have been in the cases of
Enever and of the Attorney-General and Perpetual Trustee Company
certainly the office of Common Law constable is fully entrenched in our
system. The courts of the future would certainly, in my view, read down the
chain of command situation in the Police Regulation Act in the manner
suggested by Inspector Naylor, although 1 would question the present
situation of the Commissioner exercising his discretion in relation to
applications. It certainly seems to me to be highly irregular, and could be
illegal because whereas the Commissioner may persuade his constables he
certainly cannot compel them as they have an individual discretion. This is the
constable that the genius of the Common Law produced. From a practical
point of view the keeping ofthe community peace on a day to day basis cannot
be done with a fully centralised police force or law enforcement agency
because in those circumstances with a military situation the event would be
over before the force was assembled.
Dr. Jocelynne Scull. N.S.W. Women’s Advisory Council
I would like to address the issue of police prosecutorial discretion in
relation to domestic violence cases. I could, of course, address my question to
Mr Naylor. but I shall make it a rhetorical question because I do think that
any answer that would be forthcoming would be entirely inadequate. I do not
say that with regard in any way to Mr Naylor’s capabilities, but because any
answer that would be forthcoming from both the police and from society itself
in relation to prosecutorial discretion in terms of domestic violence would be
entirely inadequate.
My question is why should the police exercise discretion quite
differently in cases of domestic violence from cases of all other types of
assault? And I might add if only the police would exercise their discretion in
relation to assaults they would be less often called upon to exercise their
discretion in relation to domestic murder. For statistics quite clearly show that
in cases of domestic murders most of them have been preceded bya history of
domestic assault to which the police have quite frequently been called.
I might also add, as an addendum, my apologies to this audience that 1
should be so boring as to once more raise the issue of domestic violence.
Recently I Went back to 1975 to trace what had happened in this area. I went
back to resolutions that came out of workshops, conferences and the like from
1975 until now. What did I ﬁnd but that the resolutions and the
recommendations that we were making in 1975 are identical to those that we
are still making in l980 because absolutely no action has been taken in this
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area. We have become rather more adept at making resolutions in I980 than
we were in I975 but that is the sum total of the progress. In I975 we were
requesting that something be donein this area; in I980 I give notice that we are
demanding
Kevin Ryan, M.P., Barrister-at-Law
I would just like to support Dr Scutt. In my electoral experience, and
this is no reﬂection on police individually but is really a reﬂection on policy,
the police are too inclined to dismiss domestic violence, and dismiss it as a
domestic matter in which they should not become involved. 1 feel that if they
did get more involved there would much more prevention than there1s now.
I am not suggesting that police should go as far as they went in David
Williamson’s play The Removalists but that they should go further than they
are going in many cases at the moment. I think one of the problems is that
police are confronted with this situation: “to protect ourselves buying into
something we have got to have a lawful arrest”. They are inclined to take a
prima facie look at the situation and say: “Is there an arrest situation or isn‘t
there? If there is not, we are going!” instead of being prepared to go into the
surrounding circumstances and have a more careful look and then withdraw
gracefully if necessary. I know it is putting a big onus on police and it is
requiring a lot of them, but I think more consideration can be given to it.
There has been a recent amendment of the Police Regulation Act which does
give much more protection to police in the bona ﬁde exercise of their
responsibilities.
Inspector J Murray, South Australia Police Department
I will enter into the last argument raised by Dr Scutt, and present some
of the difficulties that police do have in exercising their'discretion. It is
particularly evident in the area of domestic violence because that is an area
which has been traditionally one where great caution was exercised by police,
but I think historically that arose from the situation prior to the Family Law
Act. Quite often police were called in to act as evidence in the ensuing divorce
cases that might follow, and the caution that developed then remains with the
older policeman has been handed down to the younger one. The domestic
situation is particularly intricate and the caution that police do exercise there,
I must say in fairness, is very often over cautious. In South Australia we have
become particularly conscious of this and are currently embarking on
exercises to make our people more aware that domestic assault is nevertheless
an assault, and should be prosecuted as such where the circumstances justify
that I do not agree that private assault is not a criminal offence but I do
suggest from a police point of view it does meet with some very intricate and
practical difﬁculties We work with a unit thatis called a Crisis Care Unit.
These are people within the Community Welfare Department who come into
a potentially very dangerous situation a situation often faced by the police.
The wife has made an accusation ofassault the man denies it and, in fact very
often makes counter allegations that sheIS the one who has assaulted him. The
police have a real fear than when they leave, because they are unable to take
action in that situation, the threatened assault is going to be carried out.
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The Crisis Care Unit team, who are graduates is psychology and the
social sciences, come in at that stage to the home and try to appease the
situation either through counselling of the parties or, if necessary, take away
the aggrieved party to a halfway house or a women's shelter and thus remove
the potential victim from the scene. I do not know that this is entirely relevant
to police discretion, because this is a practical inability that the police have in
these particular circumstances, but I do think it is worthwhile to reply to the
domestic violence situation. I have read Dr Jocelynne Scutt‘s papers and I
agree with her feelings on the matter, but it is a step that police are trying to
cure the dilemma and the practical problem that they do have.
J. Parnell, S. M.
Very shortly in New South Wales a system of Community Justice
Centres will be introduced‘. These centres are not primarily aimed to
domestic violence, but towards neighbour disputes. I think you will find that
when these centres are introduced that whilst the combatants will not be
disengaged at the scene, nevertheless the obvious reluctance of police officers
to become involved with domestic matters will to a large extent disappear, and
‘ many of these domestic disputes will ﬁnd their way into the local Community
Justice Centre and hopefully be resolved there.
J. N. Callaghan, S. M.
Might I comment on the class system ofdomesticjustice, by saying that I
do not think a man is more entitled to hit his wife or his children than he is to
hit anybody else. As far as that goes there probably is less defence, but the
difﬁculty with all of these propositions is what are the alternatives? 1 have been
a magistrate for 20 years, and I spent 15 years in the Children‘s Courts and my
big problem was what could I do with the kids to keep them safe and to give
them a chance of growing up properly without domestic violence, without
psychological violence, and without many other damaging episodes. Since 1
have left the Children’s Court I have had my fair share of family law and ,
domestic violence and I am still faced with the same proposition. Without
being unduly critical of the federal government, I feel sure that the Family
Law Act has done absolutely nothing to reduce the incidence of domestic
violence. We probably now have an additional problem in that there is now a
greater use of barbiturate drugs and alcohol. We have the additional pressures
of women expecting more, and I am not suggesting that they should not get
more out of life, but I am old enough to remember when a woman was
satisfied to be a wife and mother and nothing else. These days women's
ambitions are a lot higher and it does lead to more conflict. 1 think it is
something that not only the police force but the whole community have to face
up to. We need more womens’ refuges, more refuges for run-a-way children,
more refuges for unmarried mothers. 1 do not think that we can blame the
police force, nor do I think that we can blame the politicians who are limited
by the amount of money that they can drag out of the taxpayer. It is only
community pressure that can remedy this situation, and I commend Dr Scutt’s
attitude.
‘ lEditors Note. See Syd. Inst. ('rim. Prat". No 40. “Crime and the Family”, pp. 74-80. for
proposed pilot study of Community Justice Centres in New South Wales.  
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Mr Stoneman asked the question “Can a diversion programme be
instituted without legislation?“ 1 am not perfectly certain that I know what he
means by a “diversion programme“ but if it means, as I suspect, power to deal
with people without a proper and regular ﬁnding of guilt then I certainly
would not be in favour of it. There is a suggestion in the United States Task
Force Report that as a condition of not prosecuting, a person by consent
would submit himself to some sort of a programme of appropriate social
welfare. This is all very well but it seems to me to be peculiarly open to
opportunities for abuse, and I would certainly approach it with a great deal of
caution.
Mr Rutherford asked “Why aren‘t these prison warders being
prosecuted?" The frank answer is that I do not know. However, whatever may
be the reason I certainly do not condone it and I would hope that no official
person would condone the application of violence to any person who is in the
lawful custody of any other person in our community. If there is a case against
anybody for assaulting a person in his custody then certainly it ought to be
prosecuted but I know nothing about the matter.
I pass over a number of very interesting points before I come to Mr
Stern’s contribution. Unfortunately, I can understand this seminar is limited
to the problems associated with the exercise of police discretion. 1 think a
greater range of problems arises (and l exclude Corporate Affairs from this
comment because they are linked very closely with lawyers in their
prosecuting activities) where departments other than the police department
institute prosecutions. The police, being part of the machinery for the
administration ofjustice, are expected to observe the assumptions of fairness.
and evenhandedness which we expect of machinery of criminal justice as a
whole. In my observation over many years they so do. Other prosecuting
departmental authorities are not part of the machinery of the administration
of criminal justice, although this is not to say that they are not fair or
evenhanded. Their job is to administer an Act and it is from that point of view
that they adopt their policy, if they do have a policy in prosecuting, and I think
that that is an area that could well be looked at.
As for special investigations, I do not think that any problem arises at i
all. The theme of my discourse has been that discretion to prosecute ought to
be legally controlled, and quite clearly it is legally controlled. It is provided for
in the Act and as Mr Woods has said unlike a D. P.P., of whom we have heard
so much in recent times, the Attorney-General is responsible to Parliament
whereas the D.P.P. is not. Those who advocate the office of D.P.P. should
perhaps read A.J.P. Taylor‘s account of the part that the D. P. P. played in the
downfall of the ﬁrst Labour government in the United Kingdom. You may
recall that that was because they withdrew a prosecution against one Eric
Campbell who was known to his friends I believe as “Eric the Red” — that
might indicate his political proclivity —— but Professor Taylor after recounting
the event in a footnote to the history of the period says that it was a stupid
decisions but adds, within brackets, “but then most Directors of Public
Prosecutions are stupid men." 1 think that we must be careful if we do have a
D.P.P. not to fall into the trap that apparently they fell into in England.
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There is one other matter I would like to raise apart from this question of
domestic violence which as lnspector Murray says, is probably the product of
a hangover from earlier times. It has been my experience that there has been a
tendency in police ofﬁcers to apply a label. “If it is domestic we do not
prosecute“. “If it’s domestic” was the label which was to be applied to those
situations. The result was that the most serious violence could be inﬂicted
upon wives or children and no prosecution would result.
Another label which was applied from time to time was “If it is
commercial”. That meant that because a person who had been dishonestly
dealt with and sometimes deprived of substantial sums of money had a civil
remedy, then the police could safely not take any criminal action. I certainly
would hope that that “commercial" tag has gone, and l surprised to learn that
the “domestic” tag still operates to tie the hands of police.
Inspector Naylor
It may not_be generally known that the Commissioner of Police has
initiated a scheme of education for police ofﬁcers. , He has appointed an
Education Ofﬁcer, a senior man at every division, who delivers these lectures
and one of the lectures is in relation to how to handle dornestic situations.
 
The following Proceedings have been published and are available for sale at
the Government Printing Ofﬁce, 390-422 Harris Street, Ultimo
and The Government Information Centre, Cnr. Hunter and Elizabeth Streets, Sydney.
All enquiries to
The Government Printer
PO. Box 75
Pyrmont, N.S.W. 2009,'
Australia.
1967 Sentencing: Part 1. Fitness to Plead.
1968(1) The Adolescent and the Law: Treat or Punish?
1968(2) Computers and the Lawyer.
1968(3) Drug Abuse in New South Wales
1969(2) Sexual Offences against Females.
1969(3) Bail.
1970(1) Abortion.
1970(2) . Male Sex Offences in Public Places.
1970(3) 10. Sentencing Project: Part 11, Probation.
1971(1) 11. Sentencing Project: Part 111. Parole of Prisoners Act, 1966.
1971(2) 12. Social Defence.
1971(3) 13." Road Safety.
1972(1) 14. Psychiatric Service for the Penal System.
1972(2) 15. Armed Robbery. ,
1973 16. Sentencing to Imprisonment — Primary Deterrent or Last Resort?
1
2
3
4
1969(1) S. 4‘ Judicial Seminar on Sentencing.
6
7
8
9
1973 17. The Right to Silence.
1974 18. Police Questioning and Confessional Statements.
1974 19. Corporate Crime
1974 20. The Protection of Children. .
1974 21. An Examination of the Parole of Prisoners in N.S.W.
1975 22. Proposed Amendments to the N.S.W. Mental Health Act (1958).
1975 23. White Collar Crime — Can the Courts Handle It? ‘
1975 24. Motoring Offences. '
1975 25. Compensation and Restitution for Victims of Crime.
1976 26. Parole in Practice in N.S.W."
1976 27. Treatment of Children Associated with Crime.
1976 28. Corporate Crime (No. 2).
1976 29. Complaints Against Police.
1977 30. Probation.
1977‘ 31. Bail (No. 2).
1977 32. The Dangerous Offender — Prediction and Assessment.
1977 33. A Diversion Programme for Drinking Drivers.
1978 34. Rights of the Mentally Ill.
1978 35. Sentencing (1978).
I978 36. Unemployment and Crime.
1979 37. White Collar Crime (No. 2).
1979 38. State. Direction & Future of Corrections:
' Part 11 — Alternatives to Imprisonment.
1979 39. State, Direction & Future of Corrections: Part 1 — Prisons.
| 1979 ' 40. Crime and the Family — Some Aspects of the Report
' of the Royal Commission on Human Relationships
1979 41. The Problem of Crime in a Federal System.
 11.77 D. West. Government Printer
::;:\J‘
v
‘_3{"u‘u;
M.
I‘8
fo‘
1.1;:
. SydnGY- N'
-7»:
A‘Jyu,
U3Ivefsity of
\75 W‘le Swen
TE 0; ‘S‘Kh!«1‘01
Guy»!
5w. 2000:
3:3
  OGY
SdeGY.
 
